Q COSTA RICA — The first speech of Costa Rica’s president-elect, Laura Fernández, was telling: it revealed both the central purpose of her continuity project and her own perception of the difficulties in fully implementing it.
Her address had two secondary motives.
The first, a necessary one, was to thank the outgoing president for having initiated a structural change in the country. The second, which reveals her own political sensitivity, was to respond to the accusations of authoritarianism that had been repeated in political and journalistic circles during the campaign.
“Democracy, democracy, democracy!” the president-elect repeated at the beginning of her victory speech. But it was a rather polysemous statement. It could refer to the strong popular support for her electoral victory, which would allow her to continue the project initiated by her predecessor, or it could clarify that she would carry it out without overstepping institutional checks and balances, the sin of which the opposition accuses her.
It is also possible that it was a combination of both, something that will become clearer with time.
The central purpose of the continuity project was stated unequivocally by Laura Chinchilla: she proclaimed that “this is the end of the Second Republic,” the one that began after the 1948 war and has lasted until today. This is a “profound and irreversible” change. Thus, this electoral victory reflects the birth of a new sociopolitical model. “Today the Third Republic is born!” he exclaimed.
That is to say, the change of model now has a clear name (the Third Republic). But two crucial questions arise: What causes justify this considerable change? And, above all, will it be possible to implement it in its full scope?
It could be argued that the electoral victory itself, of enormous proportions, after the strong criticisms leveled at the outgoing president, would be sufficient justification for the proposed radical change. But that wouldn’t explain the underlying reasons behind the success of the status quo.
Various observers, Sergio Ramírez among them, assert that this has to do with the drastic change in Costa Rican society: the peaceful and secure Costa Rica no longer exists. It should be added: neither does the Costa Rica with little inequality.
And was this slide toward insecurity and inequality inevitable? What has prevented the Costa Rican political system from avoiding this negative change?
My perception is that it stems from a disconnect between the real sociopolitical change and the prevailing political culture. From a certain perspective On a positive note, it can be said that some political projects can be victims of their own success. This is what happened with the political model that emerged from the 1948 civil war (known as the Second Republic).
Undoubtedly, this social-democratic system was a successful model that established the economic and political foundations for consolidating the most stable democracy in the region.
However, the profound societal changes were not absorbed in time. The confirmation of the shift from a rural to an urban society, the impact of global crises, the radical modification of the production model, the emergence of two spheres of consumption, as well as the inherent flaws of the political culture, among other factors, prevented the full absorption of these changes.
It must also be noted that the established way of doing politics was not without its flaws. For example, the tendency to avoid open dissent.
In other Central American countries, it is often said that if there is anything difficult, it is knowing what a Costa Rican really thinks. The inclination to give answers based on saying what the interlocutor expects to hear had political consequences. effective. Surveys on mutual trust have shown that this trust was considerably low, even compared to that of other Central American countries. And I believe that the break with that style has been a dividend for Rodrigo Chaves.
The problem is that, while profound social changes were taking place, the inclination in the majority political culture has been to insist on the features of the old, successful model. This has fostered a growing separation between those who operate this systemic nostalgia and the discontent of the country’s heartland. Something that erupted with Rodrigo Chaves’s victory in the last elections confirmed this situation.
Chaves’s tumultuous presidency has reflected both his lack of understanding of the institutional system and the resistance he has faced from those nostalgic for the previous, successful model. But the resounding electoral victory of his successor shows that, despite the outgoing president’s frequent missteps, the country’s heartland continues to support him.
However, the transition to the Third Republic is by no means guaranteed.
Chaves’s approach has consisted of reducing or eliminating many of the institutional checks and balances that prevent Costa Rica from adapting to the modern world. And that is the basis of her complaint that, in reality, those nostalgic for the old, outdated model have taken refuge within these checks and balances, and that, in practice, they have prevented her from governing. Her opponents respond that Chaves has sought to destroy the institutional checks and balances that strengthen democracy.
This dilemma reflects the challenge facing the president-elect regarding the transition to the Third Republic.
On the one hand, there is a perception that state reform is necessary. In fact, state reform has long been a frequent topic of academic and political discussion. For many specialists, the Second Republic attempted to address the high level of mutual distrust through a growing tendency toward administrative controls, something perceived by the general population as an obstructive framework that only benefits the bureaucracy and elites.
This explains why Chávez’s discourse on breaking free from this entanglement has received such considerable public support. Of course, his critics accuse him of wanting to eliminate all obstacles in order to promote authoritarian governance.
But beyond intentions, the question remains whether the transformation to the Third Republic is actually possible.
From a legislative standpoint, the new presidency faces three options. The first is to try to use ordinary laws (for which it has a sufficient majority) to produce profound institutional changes. The only certainty this option provides is that the Constitutional Court will have an exhaustive task given the sheer volume of appeals and complaints it will receive.
The second option is to pursue a popular legislative initiative, collecting signatures for a Constituent Assembly. This process would entail a bitter political struggle, potentially compounded by sharp disagreements with Rodrigo Chaves.
The third option, which would take place within the parliamentary arena, involves negotiations with the National Liberation Party (PLN), the only force that, together with the ruling party, would provide the qualified majority (38 votes) needed to achieve a constitutional reform.
This would be a difficult negotiation because the PLN is under pressure from the other progressive opposition parties and could emerge fractured from such negotiations.
In short, two scenarios are emerging. The first is to clearly establish whether a structural change to the political system, which the ruling party currently refers to as the Third Republic, is possible without abandoning the basic principles of democracy. And to know if this is possible in the complex political conditions in which the new president finds herself, facing opposition political forces fueled by intense resentment and under the watchful eye of the outgoing president.
The government transition is set for May 8, 2026. On that day, Laura Fernandez assumes the presidency, while Rodrigo Chaves is expected to become the Ministro de la Presidencia (Chief of Staff). Fernandez held that Chief of Staff position before the election, and after winning in February, she was nominated by Chaves to again fill the role.
Translated and adapted from LatinAmerica21.com