Q24N (Infobae) The debate surrounding potential US intervention—invasion—in a process of systemic change in Cuba is situated within a historical framework that links the current situation to the crisis experienced at the end of the 19th century.
The central focus of this reflection is the comparison of the existential crisis facing Cuba today, considered by some to be even more acute than that of 1898. From this perspective, it is argued that decisive support and/or intervention by the United States is the only variable with a realistic probability of leading to a free and prosperous Cuba.
Historical Parallel: The Precedent of 1898
The analysis begins with a parallel to the Cuban situation at the end of the 19th century. At that time, Cuba was experiencing economic devastation, famine, epidemics, and a military conflict whose outcome was still uncertain, if not for everyone, then certainly for many of its participants. The independence movement, weakened and lacking international support, had to confront a colonial power that was much stronger militarily.
In that context, several independence leaders understood that victory achieved solely through their own resources was, at best, uncertain, and they began actively seeking U.S. involvement.
The American intervention was neither spontaneous nor imposed, but rather the result of a deliberate political strategy devised by the Cuban Revolutionary Party and Mambí figures who sought to save the independence cause and prevent total national collapse.
Contemporary Cuba: A Transformed Regime and a Society in Crisis
The document—published by the author for Cuba Siglo 21—argues that present-day Cuba is experiencing a situation similar to that of 1959. The regime that emerged in 1959 has evolved from a totalitarian communist system to what is described as a “mafia state,” controlled by a kleptocratic elite that, through the GAESA conglomerate, dominates the country’s economic and financial resources, repressing any dissent or opposition.
The Cuban population, disarmed, fragmented, impoverished, and facing crises of food, energy, health, and connectivity, lacks sufficient organizational capacity to displace the established power on its own. It concludes that insisting solely on traditional forms of opposition—such as civic protests, international denunciations, or calls for dialogue—would hardly generate real change within a timeframe compatible with the severity of the current humanitarian crisis.
Undesirable, Preferable, or Essential?
One of the text’s fundamental arguments is that decisive US intervention or support is the only variable with a significant probability of success. The author distinguishes between what is “preferable” and what is “essential”: the preferable solution would be an internal, peaceful, and exclusively Cuban one, but history and current conditions demonstrate that this is not always viable.
Just as the Cuban independence fighters (Mambises) would have preferred to defeat Spain alone, they ultimately concluded that they needed foreign aid to avoid defeat and shorten the suffering of the Cuban people.
Similarly, it is argued that present-day Cuba has reached the point where external aid ceases to be an option and becomes a strategic necessity.
Independence Leaders: Heroes of Yesterday, “Traitors” of Today?
The text pays particular attention to the independence leaders, posing a provocative analogy: according to the logic of the current Cuban government’s official discourse, historical figures like Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo would be considered “traitors” or “annexationists.”
Both, especially from the end of 1896 onward, considered U.S. intervention essential to ensuring victory over Spain. It is noted that Maceo conveyed favorable expectations to his troops in the event of U.S. intervention, and that Gómez and Estrada Palma promoted diplomatic efforts aimed at actively involving Washington.
Contemporary official discourse tends to conceal or minimize these facts because they contradict the narrative that portrays any collaboration with the United States as unpatriotic.
The Protection of Sovereignty: From the Teller Amendment to the Helms-Burton Act
Another key argument is that the Helms-Burton Act should not be interpreted as a threat to Cuban sovereignty, but rather as a mechanism for its protection. A parallel is drawn between the Teller Amendment of 1898 and Chapter II of the Helms-Burton Act: just as the Teller Amendment conditioned U.S. intervention on a commitment not to annex Cuba and to transfer power to a government elected by the Cuban people, the Helms-Burton Act provides for a transitional phase followed by free elections and the restoration of sovereign control by the Cuban people.
According to this interpretation, the law acts as a roadmap toward democratization, not as an instrument of annexation.
The Manipulation of Fear
The document dedicates a section to dismantling what it calls “the manipulation of fear” employed by the Cuban government and its supporters in the face of the possibility of a U.S. intervention. Official propaganda has constructed a series of fears to discourage any popular support for this option: loss of sovereignty, annexation, indiscriminate massacres, economic plunder, or widespread national resistance.
These fears ignore both the technological evolution of current conflicts and the political and moral erosion of the regime. Furthermore, the use of the label “annexationist” serves as a propaganda tool to delegitimize those who demand democratic changes and external alliances.
- Sovereignty: The regime alleges that sovereignty would be violated, but the document argues that sovereignty was eliminated by the state itself in 1959 when it suppressed free elections; you cannot violate what does not exist.
- Massacres: Faced with the fear of indiscriminate bombings, it is argued that current technology allows for surgical and precise attacks against the repressive forces, thus preventing massacres of civilians.
- Annexation: It is argued that annexing 11 million impoverished people would be an unsustainable fiscal burden for the United States and would not have the support of the current American political class.
- Historical hypocrisy: It is recalled that those who today denounce Yankee “annexationism” were in the past “pro-Soviet annexationists,” ceding territory for Soviet military bases and including a constitutional clause that tied the island to the Soviet Union.
In this context, the essay argues that, despite fear campaigns, US intervention is no longer a fringe idea among Cubans, but an increasingly “normalized” possibility. Recent polls, both inside and outside Cuba, indicate that broad sectors of society view some decisive US involvement in resolving the Cuban crisis favorably. This has broadened the so-called “Overton Window,” making the debate about intervention less taboo.
A Prosperous and Reinvented Cuba
The document offers a hopeful vision of Cuba’s recovery after a regime change. Unlike the more than 60 years of dependence on the USSR or Venezuela, it argues that Cuba would not require a “Marshall Plan” or an economy subsidized by foreign powers. The country’s future prosperity would rest on three pillars:
- Transnational population: a diaspora with financial and human capital ready to invest in the country.
- Entrepreneurial culture: an entrepreneurial spirit that has survived despite decades of repression.
- Geographic proximity: closeness to the world’s largest market, allowing integration into modern production chains.
Conclusion
In conclusion, what would be preferable—a non-violent and purely Cuban solution—has become impossible due to the intransigence of the ruling elite, making external intervention essential to prevent the nation’s physical disappearance.
It is argued that maintaining the status quo is unfeasible and that the humanitarian crisis demands urgent responses. Among the possible scenarios, mass protests protected by coercive US support appear to be the most legitimate and with the greatest probability of success.
Although the United States has its own interests, it is suggested that these may coincide with those of the Cuban people, as occurred at the end of the 19th century.
The final message is that the Cuban dilemma is not between sovereignty and foreign aid, but between prolonging the crisis or taking calculated risks to rescue freedom and rebuild the nation.