Q COSTA RICA — ¿Qué tienen en común el Parmigiano Reggiano, una pasta elaborada en Gragnano, un pistacho cultivado en las laderas del Etna y un tomate producido al sur del Vesubio? Además de ser referentes de la gastronomía italiana, comparten un elemento esencial: su estrecha relación con el territorio donde nacieron.
Italia protege ese patrimonio mediante denominaciones como DOP (Denominación de Origen Protegida) e IGP (Indicación Geográfica Protegida), que permiten al consumidor reconocer productos vinculados con determinadas regiones, métodos de elaboración y tradiciones.
En Costa Rica, este esfuerzo da continuidad a las acciones que la Embajada de Italia y la Italian Trade Agency (ITA) vienen desarrollando a través de “Italia en su mesa”, iniciativa orientada a acercar al consumidor costarricense a los productos, territorios y tradiciones de la cultura gastronómica italiana.
Estos son 12 productos y ingredientes que permiten recorrer Italia a través de sus territorios, ingredientes y tradiciones.
Producto
Territorio
Descripción
Parmigiano Reggiano DOP
Emilia-Romagna / Lombardia
Queso de larga maduración, símbolo de Emilia-Romagna, reconocido por su textura granulosa y sabor intenso.
Pasta di Gragnano IGP
Campania
Pasta de Campania, de superficie rugosa y tradición centenaria, ideal para adherir las salsas.
Pomodoro San Marzano DOP
Campania
Tomate cultivado cerca del Vesubio, apreciado por su pulpa carnosa, dulzor y baja acidez.
Nocciola del Piemonte IGP
Piemonte
Avellana de Piemonte reconocida por su aroma intenso, textura crujiente y sabor persistente.
Pistacchio Verde di Bronte DOP
Sicilia
El “oro verde” de Sicilia, cultivado en las laderas volcánicas del Etna.
Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena DOP
Emilia-Romagna
Vinagre de Modena elaborado con mosto de uva y envejecido durante años según métodos tradicionales.
Basilico Genovese DOP
Liguria
Albahaca de Liguria, de aroma delicado e ingrediente emblemático del pesto genovés.
Cantuccini Toscani IGP
Toscana
Crujientes galletas de almendra que forman parte de la tradición dulce de Toscana.
Prosciutto di Parma DOP
Emilia-Romagna
Jamón curado de Parma, reconocido por su delicado sabor y su tradicional proceso de maduración.
Olio Toscano IGP
Toscana
Aceite de oliva virgen extra que expresa la tradición y el paisaje oleícola de Toscana.
Prosecco DOP
Veneto / Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Vino espumoso del noreste de Italia, reconocido por su frescura, aromas frutales y finas burbujas.
Grappa della Valle d’Aosta IG
Valle d’Aosta
Destilado de orujo que refleja la tradición vitivinícola y el carácter alpino de Valle d’Aosta.
Cada producto cuenta un territorio
Las denominaciones de origen permiten reconocer el vínculo entre un producto agroalimentario y el lugar donde nace, así como el conocimiento y las prácticas que forman parte de su elaboración.
“Hablar de gastronomía italiana es hablar de muchos territorios, cada uno con productos, sabores y tradiciones propias. Esa diversidad es una de nuestras mayores riquezas y queremos que el público costarricense pueda descubrirla, conocer las historias que hay detrás de cada producto y entender cómo cada región aporta algo único a la identidad gastronómica de Italia”, explicó la embajadora de Italia en Costa Rica, Elena Sgarbi.
Acercarse a estos productos es también una forma de conocer Italia a través de su gastronomía.
Fuente: Ambasciata d’Italia, San José de Costa Rica
Carlo Díaz (in a plaid shirt) and U.S. Ambassador Melinda Hildebrand (tan jacket), one day after the re-election of the Prosecutor General, during a visit to the Prosecutor’s Office in Los Chiles. (Photo: Public Prosecutor’s Office)
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rica’s re-elected Attorney General, Carlo Díaz, is entering his second term with a sharper understanding of the country’s criminal and political tensions—and with a public promise to defend the independence of the Ministerio Público (Public Prosecutor’s Office) against any attempt to weaken it.
Speaking at a nearly 40-minute press conference after receiving the unanimous backing of the Supreme Court’s Full Court, Díaz said his first term had taught him that Costa Rica faced a more complicated reality than he initially understood. The challenge, he said, was not only the rise of crime but also the growing political pressure surrounding the institutions responsible for confronting it.
“Four years ago, we were not aware that a more complex situation was approaching, from a criminal perspective, but also from a political perspective,” Díaz said.
That assessment frames the next phase of his tenure.
His comments suggest that the Public Prosecutor’s Office will continue to pursue organized crime while expanding its attention toward the financial and political networks that allow drug trafficking to operate beyond the people traditionally identified as traffickers.
From visible traffickers to “invisible” traffickers
Díaz highlighted the agency’s cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as with European authorities. He said the first phase of collaboration with the DEA focused on already identified drug traffickers. The second phase, he explained, is aimed at people who do not appear to be directly involved in narcotics but whose economic or political power may conceal ties to the trade.
He described these figures as “invisible traffickers”: people whose apparently successful business activities may mask income or relationships connected to drug trafficking.
Díaz pointed to the arrest of a Costa Rican citizen of Chinese origin, Guobin Tam Zhang, also known as Juan Carlos Tam Cheong (or Tam Shang), as an early example of this new approach. The attorney general emphasized that the person had links with political figures, while cautioning that such links were not necessarily criminal. The investigation, he said, is not over.
The distinction matters. Díaz is not publicly alleging that every political relationship represents wrongdoing. He is warning that organized crime may exploit legitimate social, commercial, and political connections to gain influence and protection. His stated goal is to investigate not only traffickers but also public officials who knowingly assist them.
That would represent a more politically sensitive stage of the country’s anti-narcotics strategy. Arresting a conventional drug trafficker is one thing. Investigating people with money, status, institutional access, or relationships with elected officials is another. It brings the Public Prosecutor’s Office closer to the center of political conflict—and increases the likelihood of resistance.
Díaz acknowledged as much, saying that his new targets are “quite high” and that pressure could come from different directions. His response was blunt: the Public Prosecutor’s Office, he said, would not kneel before such pressure.
A direct confrontation over institutional independence
Díaz’s most forceful remarks concerned the relationship between the Public Prosecutor’s Office and President Laura Fernández’s administration.
He said he was willing to work with the president and other state institutions to fight crime, including both organized and conventional crime. But he drew a firm line: cooperation would end if the government tried to weaken the Public Prosecutor’s Office, reduce its budget, or interfere with its independence.
“If the president needs me to work with her for the good of Costa Rica, she will find a Public Prosecutor’s Office supporting her,” Díaz said. “But if she wants to weaken us, take away our budget, or undermine the institution, she will find a defender of the independence of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, democracy, and the institutional system.”
The language reflects a broader dispute over the boundaries between political authority and judicial independence. Díaz rejected the suggestion that he had been making partisan political statements. He said he was defending the Constitution, the law, the separation of powers, and the rule of law—not intervening in electoral politics.
Still, the distinction may not satisfy critics. In a polarized political environment, defending an institution can quickly be interpreted as opposing the government that challenges it. Díaz’s position is therefore both legal and political in its consequences, even if he insists that its purpose is institutional rather than partisan.
His use of the word “populism” is especially revealing. Díaz said that attacks from populism would find him defending democracy and institutional stability. That statement places him directly against political rhetoric that portrays judges, prosecutors, or magistrates as obstacles to public safety.
He offered two explanations. The diplomatic one was that he had been in the Dominican Republic attending an annual meeting of PAcCTO, a European institution focused on organized crime. His less diplomatic explanation was that he would not attend a dinner or visit a home where he knew he would be insulted and would not be able to respond.
The remarks referred to comments by President Fernández suggesting that some prosecutors, judges, and magistrates were aligned with criminal interests. Díaz called those statements serious and inappropriate, arguing that they attacked people confronting crime directly and risked deepening divisions in the country.
His criticism is part of a larger institutional disagreement over how to explain Costa Rica’s worsening prison and security problems. The government’s rhetoric appears to place some responsibility on judicial actors and other institutions. Díaz, by contrast, argues that prosecutors and judges are the people confronting organized crime and absorbing the consequences of the country’s security crisis.
The dispute is not merely about personalities. It concerns who gets to define the causes of crime—and who is blamed when the state fails to contain it.
Unanimous support, but no guarantee of calm
Díaz portrayed his unanimous re-election as a vote of confidence in the work of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. He attributed the result less to personal political skill than to the work of prosecutors across the institution.
He said he was simply the “director of the orchestra,” while the prosecutors were the people playing the instruments. He also stressed that he had not asked magistrates for votes or made commitments in exchange for their support.
That unanimous backing gives Díaz a strong institutional mandate at the beginning of his second term. It also sends a message to the executive branch: whatever doubts or criticism may exist around the attorney general, the Supreme Court’s Full Court has chosen to support his continuation.
Yet the vote will not shield him from political pressure.
His second term is likely to be more difficult than his first because the targets he describes are more powerful, the relationship with the government is already strained, and public confidence in state institutions is being tested by rising crime and polarization.
The DEA partnership could become central to this period. International cooperation may provide intelligence, resources, and political support for complex investigations. It may also draw criticism if Costa Ricans perceive the country’s criminal-justice priorities as being shaped too heavily by foreign agencies.
Díaz appears prepared to accept that risk. His message is that drug trafficking is no longer limited to armed groups or recognizable criminal figures. It can also exist behind respectable businesses, political access, and institutional corruption.
The meaning of Díaz’s second act
Díaz’s remarks amount to a declaration of priorities: deeper cooperation with the DEA, investigations into hidden financial and political networks, action against officials who facilitate organized crime, and a public defense of judicial independence.
They also reveal a strategy for surviving the political environment. Díaz is presenting himself as willing to cooperate with the government when the goal is fighting crime, but unwilling to remain silent when political leaders attack the institutions carrying out that work.
That posture may appeal to those who see the Public Prosecutor’s Office as a necessary check on executive power. It may frustrate those who believe judicial institutions have become too insulated from democratic accountability. Either way, Díaz has chosen visibility over caution.
His second term will test whether that approach can produce results without pushing the country’s institutions further apart. The success of his agenda will depend not only on arrests, international alliances, or investigations, but also on whether Costa Rica’s branches of government can fight organized crime without turning the fight itself into another source of institutional conflict.
For now, Díaz’s message is clear: the next phase will target people who operate behind power and respectability—and he intends to defend the Public Prosecutor’s Office if the political cost becomes high.
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rica is expected to experience a warmer-than-usual December, even as seasonal cold surges begin moving into Central America.
The forecast highlights a familiar contradiction in the country’s late-year weather: cold fronts can still bring brief drops in temperature, stronger winds and increased cloud cover, while the broader seasonal pattern remains warmer than normal. Rather than producing a sustained cooldown, these “cold surges” are likely to arrive as short-lived interruptions in an otherwise hot December.
The effects are expected to vary significantly by region. Mountainous areas and the Central Valley may feel the sharpest temperature changes when cold air moves southward. Coastal and lowland communities, by contrast, are more likely to continue experiencing elevated daytime heat, particularly during periods of clear skies and limited rainfall.
Cold surges will not necessarily mean a cooler month
A cold surge, known locally as an empuje frío, occurs when a mass of cooler air advances from North America into Central America. In Costa Rica, these systems can influence wind patterns, lower nighttime temperatures and increase the sensation of coolness in higher elevations.
Their arrival does not mean that the entire month will be cold. These events are generally temporary, and their intensity depends on how far south the air mass travels and how long it remains over the region. A strong surge may produce noticeably cooler mornings, while a weaker one may be felt mainly through wind and cloud cover.
That distinction matters because a few cool days can create the impression of a normal or even chilly December, despite average temperatures remaining above historical levels across the month.
Heat could affect water demand and public health
A warmer December would have consequences beyond personal comfort. Higher temperatures can increase demand for drinking water and electricity, especially as households and businesses rely more heavily on fans and air conditioning.
Heat also poses a health risk, particularly for older adults, young children, outdoor workers and people with cardiovascular or respiratory conditions. Even in a country accustomed to warm weather, prolonged heat can cause dehydration, exhaustion and other illnesses when people do not have access to shade, water or adequate ventilation.
The most vulnerable periods may occur when warm conditions persist for several days between cold surges. Those intervals can be easy to underestimate because the arrival of a cooler front temporarily reduces the sense of risk.
A complicated outlook for agriculture
Agriculture could face mixed conditions. Short periods of cooler, windier weather may affect sensitive crops, while persistent heat can increase evaporation and place additional stress on soil and water supplies.
For farmers, the key issue is not simply whether December will be hot. It is the combination of temperature, rainfall, wind and humidity. A warmer month with regular precipitation may have a different impact from a warmer month marked by longer dry spells. Sudden changes between heat, wind and rain can also complicate planting, irrigation and crop protection.
Livestock producers may face similar challenges. Hot conditions can reduce animal comfort and productivity, making access to shade and water increasingly important.
Why the forecast deserves attention
The central message is that isolated weather events should not be confused with the larger climate pattern. A cold surge can be real and noticeable while the month as a whole still ranks as unusually warm.
That tension is becoming more important as communities plan for periods of greater temperature variability. Seasonal forecasts are not guarantees, and conditions can change as atmospheric systems evolve. Still, they help authorities, businesses and households prepare for likely stresses on health services, water systems, agriculture and energy use.
Costa Rica’s December outlook therefore calls for flexibility rather than reliance on a single weather narrative. Residents may need a jacket on a cool, windy morning in the highlands and protection from intense heat later in the same week. The arrival of cold surges may provide temporary relief, but it should not obscure the broader expectation of a warmer-than-normal month.
In November 2025, the Nanobiosystems Laboratory (Lanambios) acquired a Tissuelabs-brand bioprinter, intended for the development of biological models and new biomedical applications. Credit: UCR
Q COSTA RICA — The Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR)—University of Costa Rica—has acquired its first 3D bioprinter, expanding the country’s ability to research human-tissue regeneration, biomaterials, and personalized medicine.
The equipment, manufactured by Tissuelabs, was purchased in November 2025 by the university’s Nanobiosystems Laboratory, part of the Center for Research in Atomic, Nuclear and Molecular Sciences within UCR’s Faculty of Sciences. The university says the system will allow researchers to build biological models that reproduce some of the characteristics of real human tissue.
The development does not mean that Costa Rica is ready to print transplantable organs or offer bioprinted treatments to patients. Its immediate purpose is research: creating controlled three-dimensional structures that can be used to study how materials, cells and tissues interact.
According to the report, the technology could strengthen work involving bone regeneration, tissue engineering, biophysics, microfluidics and biomaterials.
From materials to tissue-like systems
Conventional 3D printers manufacture objects from materials such as plastic or resin. Bioprinters are designed to deposit biocompatible substances and, depending on the project, living cells in precise patterns. This makes it possible to construct models that more closely resemble the organization and behavior of biological tissue.
That distinction is important. Researchers can learn a great deal by studying a material on its own, but biological systems are more complicated. Cells respond to their surroundings, interact with neighboring cells, and react differently when exposed to mechanical forces, chemicals, or changes in structure.
Leonardo Lesser Rojas, a researcher at UCR’s Center for Research in Atomic, Nuclear and Molecular Sciences, said the new equipment will help researchers move beyond examining materials in isolation and toward studying systems that more closely reflect the conditions found in actual tissue.
The initial focus includes bone regeneration. Damaged bone can sometimes repair itself, but serious injuries, disease, and large defects may require grafts or other interventions. Researchers hope that engineered structures could eventually support the repair of damaged tissue or provide alternatives to existing grafting techniques.
International research is also exploring bioprinted skin substitutes, cartilage structures and bone grafts. These applications remain at different stages of laboratory and clinical development, and their success depends on factors such as the material’s strength, compatibility with the body, vascularization and the ability of living cells to function properly after implantation.
A broader platform for biomedical research
UCR has registered a pilot project called “Development of an Integrated 3D Bioprinting and Organ-on-Chip Platform.” The project will combine three-dimensional biological models with organ-on-chip systems—small devices designed to reproduce selected functions and conditions of human organs.
Together, these tools could help scientists study disease, observe cellular behavior and test how tissues respond to different stimuli. They may also offer a way to conduct certain experiments in models that are more biologically relevant than a flat cell culture, while reducing reliance on less representative laboratory systems.
The university also envisions using the platform for academic training, applied research and specialized services for companies and other institutions. Students are already receiving training in the operation and potential applications of the bioprinter, including senior physics students Estefany García and María José Víquez.
This educational dimension may be just as significant as the machine itself. Advanced biomedical equipment is valuable only when researchers know how to use it, maintain it and connect it to meaningful scientific questions. By training students and bringing together specialists in physics, engineering, biology and materials science, UCR can build expertise that lasts beyond a single project.
3D bioprinting technology opens up possibilities for developing skin substitutes, cartilage structures, and bone grafts—applications that are advancing through various stages of research and international clinical development. Credit: UCR
Why the development matters
Costa Rica’s achievement is less about owning a sophisticated printer than about building a national research capacity around it. A shared platform could allow different university groups, hospitals, public institutions and companies to collaborate on projects that would otherwise require access to laboratories abroad.
It may also help Costa Rican researchers develop models suited to local research priorities rather than relying entirely on imported technologies. Over time, that could strengthen the country’s position in biomaterials, regenerative medicine and biomedical engineering.
Still, the path from a printed tissue model to a medical treatment is long. Researchers must demonstrate that a structure is safe, stable and effective. They must understand how the body will respond to it, determine whether it can receive a blood supply, and meet strict regulatory requirements before clinical use. Personalized tissue engineering introduces additional challenges involving the patient’s cells, manufacturing consistency and cost.
For that reason, the most accurate description of the UCR initiative is not that Costa Rica is about to print human organs. It is that the country has acquired a tool that may allow its scientists to study human biology with greater precision and develop the foundations for future regenerative therapies.
The project’s success will depend on what comes next: sustained funding, interdisciplinary collaboration, rigorous validation and partnerships capable of moving promising laboratory results toward clinical research. If those conditions are met, the new bioprinter could become more than an isolated piece of equipment. It could serve as the center of a broader biomedical ecosystem in Costa Rica—one that trains researchers, supports local science and explores new ways to repair damaged tissue.
Q COSTA RICA — His tenure is now secure following his unanimous reelection for the next four years as the country’s Attorney General. So, it can also be a time to take off the gloves, so to speak.
On Monday, all 21 magistrates of the Full Court reelected Carlo Díaz to head the Fiscalía (Prosecutor’s Office), entrusting him to continue his fight against corruption in government and organized crime.
Díaz was one of the members of the Judiciary who did not attend the opening of the Centro de Alta Contención del Crimen Organizado (Cacco)—Center for the High Containment of Organized Crime—Costa Rica’s new high-security prison.
Days after the event, President Laura Fernández was critical of Díaz and the other members of the Judiciary who had kept quiet until yesterday, when Díaz broke the silence to defend his decision not to attend.
Díaz offered two explanations, mainly for what he described as a hostile political environment at the Cacco ceremony.
“Would you attend an event or a dinner where you know you are going to be insulted or hear things like those expressed there?” Díaz said, according to CR Hoy. “I would not go to a house where I am going to be offended, where I will not even be able to respond or express myself about what is being said to me.”
Díaz called the president’s remarks “very serious” and unacceptable. He also framed the dispute as part of a broader concern about the use of political power and the treatment of independent institutions.
The headline of the CR Hoy report reflects the central point of his response: “The one who abuses power is just as much a criminal as the one who steals.”
The statement does not equate every form of political disagreement with a criminal offense. Rather, it signals Díaz’s argument that corruption and abuses of authority can damage the state just as severely as conventional crimes.
A dispute larger than one missed ceremony
At first glance, the controversy concerns a single official’s absence from a prison-infrastructure event. The deeper conflict is institutional.
The Cacco project is closely associated with the government’s public-security agenda. A ceremony celebrating new high-containment facilities offered the administration an opportunity to project control over organized crime and to rally political support around tougher prison measures. Díaz’s absence disrupted that message, especially because the Public Prosecutor’s Office plays a central role in investigating and prosecuting the criminal networks the facilities are intended to contain.
The president’s criticism appears to have turned a scheduling issue into a public confrontation between the executive branch and the country’s chief prosecutor. Díaz’s response, in turn, recast the absence as a matter of institutional dignity and independence.
That distinction matters. Government officials may expect cooperation from judicial authorities at events tied to national security, but cooperation is not the same as political alignment. A prosecutor who appears beside the executive at a high-profile ceremony can be seen as endorsing the government’s policies. A prosecutor who stays away may be accused of disrespect or obstruction. Either choice carries political consequences.
Díaz’s explanation seeks to establish that his absence was neither indifference toward public safety nor hostility toward the prison project. He was engaged in an international meeting focused on organized crime, he said, and he deliberately avoided an event where he believed he would be publicly attacked without a fair chance to respond.
The significance of the power-abuse warning
Díaz’s language also points to a familiar democratic tension: the danger that the fight against crime becomes a justification for weakening institutional checks.
Prison expansion and tougher security policies can respond to genuine public concerns, particularly when organized crime places pressure on courts, communities, and law-enforcement agencies. Yet those policies still require oversight. The executive branch controls government policy and administration; prosecutors and courts are expected to apply the law independently.
When officials accuse one another of criminality, the public debate can quickly become personal. That may energize supporters, but it can also obscure the more important question: are public institutions operating within their legal authority, and are they able to criticize one another without retaliation?
Q COSTA RICA — An inspection conducted by the Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio (MEIC)—Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce—revealed that seven out of every ten restaurants inspected in Costa Rica fail to comply with legal requirements regarding price information—a situation that could expose them to substantial financial penalties.
The operation, carried out between September 7 and September 25, 2026, covered 70 full-service (table-service) restaurants located across 13 cantons and 22 districts within the provinces of San José, Cartago, Heredia, Alajuela, and Limón.
According to the released results, only 19 establishments—equivalent to 27%—complied with all the regulations reviewed, while 51 restaurants—accounting for 73%—exhibited at least one irregularity.
The investigation sought to determine whether businesses clearly disclosed the final price of their products—including taxes and mandatory charges—and whether the advertised prices matched what was ultimately charged to customers.
The 10% service charge: one of the primary irregularities.
One of the most significant findings was that 36 restaurants—representing 51% of the establishments inspected—failed to correctly state the final price of their products on their menus.
Within this group, 33 businesses failed to include the 10% service charge for table service, while three other establishments included neither that charge nor the 13% Impuesto al Valor Agregado (IVA)—Value Added Tax.
Costa Rican legislation stipulates that advertised prices must reflect the total amount the consumer will pay, with no additional mandatory charges that have not already been factored in.
Law No. 9116 regulates the 10% table service charge, while Law No. 7472—the Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor—Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense—establishes obligations regarding price transparency.
This means that a restaurant cannot advertise a price that subsequently increases due to the addition of mandatory charges that should have been included from the start.
Restaurants also concealed the prices of food and drinks
The inspection revealed that 12 establishments—representing 17%—offered food or drinks without displaying their respective prices.
According to the MEIC, this prevents customers from knowing in advance how much they will have to pay for the items they select.
Furthermore, another 12 restaurants (17%) were found to be in violation of requirements regarding the minimum information that must be included on invoices or receipts. Among the deficiencies detected are the absence of the establishment’s exact address, the merchant’s name, a telephone number, or the corresponding identification number.
The Ministry warned that these omissions could hinder consumers from filing complaints or reports.
Businesses face the risk of substantial fines
In light of these irregularities, the MEIC notified the 51 non-compliant establishments, instructing them to correct the identified shortcomings.
As of October 15, follow-up assessments showed that 20 restaurants had fully rectified the issues, while 13 remained under supervision, and another 18 had failed to provide information regarding the requested corrections.
The MEIC warned that businesses that do not comply with these directives may be reported to the Comisión Nacional del Consumidor (CNC)—National Consumer Commission.
According to Article 57 of Law No. 7472, fines can range from 10 to 40 times the “base salary,” depending on the severity of the infraction.
For 2026, the applicable base salary is ¢462,200; consequently, potential penalties could range from ¢4,622,000 to ¢18,488,000.
These fines have not yet been imposed on the establishments under inspection; rather, they represent the penalties that could be applied following the appropriate administrative procedure.
The MEIC reminded consumers that they have the right to know the total price of food and beverages before making a purchase.
Individuals who identify irregularities may contact the toll-free hotline 800-CONSUMO (800-266-7866) or use the digital assistant “PACO te Asesora,” available via WhatsApp at 6140-9657.
Complaints may also be filed through the “Consumidor CR” platform, accessible on the Ministry’s official website: www.meic.go.cr.
Q — There is no continuous road connecting North America and South America. A driver can travel thousands of miles from Alaska or Canada through the United States, Mexico, Central America, and into Panama—but the route ends abruptly before Colombia.
The obstacle is the Darién Gap, a roadless stretch of dense rainforest, wetlands, mountains, and swamps between Panama and Colombia. It is the only place where the Pan-American Highway, the proposed road network linking much of the Americas, remains broken.
That makes it physically impossible to complete the journey entirely by car. A traveler must ship the vehicle around the gap, transport it by boat, or cross the region using a combination of hiking and off-road travel. None of those options counts as driving continuously from one continent to the other.
Image created by Grok
The missing link in the Pan-American Highway
The Pan-American Highway is not one single road built and managed by a central authority. It is a loose network of highways that stretches from North America through Central America and into South America. Most of the route is paved and accessible to ordinary vehicles.
The highway’s most famous interruption lies between Yaviza, Panama, and the Colombian border. The distance is roughly 100 to 160 kilometers (60 to 100 miles), depending on how the gap is measured, but the challenge is far greater than the distance suggests.
There are no public roads across the region. Rivers, steep terrain, heavy rainfall, unstable ground, and thick vegetation make conventional road construction extremely difficult. Even where trails exist, they are not a continuous drivable route.
The gap is not an accidental omission on a map. It reflects a combination of geography, environmental concerns, political disputes, Indigenous land rights, public-health fears, security risks, and the enormous cost of construction.
The main overland route of the Pan-American Highway, a network of roads roughly 19,000–30,000 miles (30,000–48,000 km) long from Prudhoe Bay, Alaska (or points farther south in the US/Canada) to Ushuaia, Argentina (or Buenos Aires). It is not fully continuous. The Darién Gap (about 100 km of dense rainforest, swamp, and mountains between Yaviza, Panama, and Turbo, Colombia) has no road.
A landscape hostile to road building
The Darién Gap is one of the most difficult environments in the Western Hemisphere in which to build and maintain a highway.
Much of the region consists of tropical rainforest, marshes, floodplains, and rugged hills. Rivers can rise quickly during intense rainfall, washing out roads and bridges. Roads cut through wet tropical terrain also require constant maintenance because erosion, landslides, and flooding can destroy them faster than crews can repair them.
A paved highway would need bridges, drainage systems, retaining structures, and frequent resurfacing. Building the road would be expensive; keeping it open would be an ongoing challenge.
The absence of roads also means there is little supporting infrastructure. There are no continuous fuel stations, repair shops, emergency services, or established transport corridors along the route. A vehicle attempting to cross would not simply be driving on a rough version of an existing highway. It would be trying to move through terrain where no highway exists.
Environmental and Indigenous concerns
The Darién region contains some of the largest remaining areas of relatively intact rainforest in Central America. It supports jaguars, tapirs, harpy eagles, monkeys, reptiles, and countless other species. Panama’s Darién National Park is also a UNESCO World Heritage site.
A major highway could fragment habitats and make it easier for logging, mining, land clearing, and large-scale settlement to expand into previously isolated areas. Roads often have effects far beyond the pavement itself: they provide access for development and make it easier to transport timber, livestock, and other resources.
Indigenous communities also live in and around the Darién, including the Emberá and Guna peoples. Any road project would raise difficult questions about land ownership, consent, displacement, and the preservation of traditional ways of life.
Supporters of a highway have argued that a completed connection would improve trade and transportation. Critics have countered that the environmental and social costs could be permanent, while the economic benefits would be unevenly distributed.
Disease and agricultural risks
Another reason the highway has not been completed is the risk of spreading livestock diseases.
The Darién Gap has historically served as a barrier between livestock populations in North and South America. Authorities have worried that a continuous highway could make it easier for diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease to move between regions. An outbreak could cause major damage to cattle industries and lead to restrictions on livestock movement and agricultural exports.
That concern has shaped government policy for decades. Even if modern inspection systems could reduce the danger, preventing the uncontrolled movement of animals and agricultural products would require extensive checkpoints and enforcement.
Security and humanitarian dangers
The region has also been difficult to govern and secure. The Darién has been used by smugglers, traffickers, armed groups, and other criminal networks. Its terrain makes patrols and emergency response difficult.
In recent years, the gap has become a major migration route. Hundreds of thousands of migrants have crossed the region in some years, often on foot and under dangerous conditions. Travelers face rivers, steep slopes, disease, dehydration, criminal violence, and the risk of injury far from medical care.
That migration route is not evidence of a drivable passage. People may be able to move through a region on foot, with guides, or along improvised trails without there being any road capable of carrying ordinary vehicles.
Why off-road vehicles don’t solve the problem
It is possible to find stories of specially prepared vehicles crossing parts of the Darién Gap. These expeditions typically involve military-style trucks, motorcycles, winches, boats, makeshift bridges, and extensive logistical support. Some vehicles have been dismantled, carried, floated, or hauled around obstacles.
Those feats are often described as “driving across the Darién,” but the wording can be misleading. They are not ordinary road trips. The vehicles may spend long periods being dragged through mud, loaded onto boats, lifted over obstacles, or transported in pieces. The journey depends on specialized crews and equipment.
A standard passenger car could not simply follow a road from Panama into Colombia because no such road exists. Even a powerful four-wheel-drive vehicle would face terrain that may be impassable without major human intervention.
How travelers move their vehicles around the gap
People attempting to travel by road from North America to South America usually stop in Panama and arrange to transport their vehicle by sea to Colombia or another nearby destination. The vehicle may be shipped in a container or transported using a roll-on/roll-off service, depending on the port, the vehicle, and current logistics.
The traveler then continues by road after retrieving the vehicle in South America. This creates a practical connection between the two continents, but not a continuous drive. The vehicle has crossed the gap by ship rather than by road.
That distinction matters because the barrier is not the absence of a land connection between North and South America. The continents are connected by land through Central America. The problem is that there is no passable public road through one specific section of that land bridge.
Is it truly “physically impossible”?
The phrase needs some qualification.
It is not physically impossible for a vehicle to enter the Darién region or for a specially organized expedition to move a vehicle across portions of it. Humans have crossed the gap, and exceptional overland expeditions have transported vehicles through terrain that lacks roads.
What is physically impossible is driving continuously along a normal, public, connected road from North America to South America.
In practical terms, the gap is a missing piece of the Pan-American Highway. It turns what appears on a map to be one enormous road journey into two road journeys joined by a logistical transfer.
The larger significance
The Darién Gap illustrates that roads are not determined by geography alone. Engineering can overcome many natural barriers, but roads are also political choices. Governments must decide whether the economic value of a connection justifies the cost, environmental damage, public-health risks, and social disruption.
For now, the answer remains no. North and South America are linked by highways across most of their combined length, but not all the way through. Until a road is built across the Darién—or an entirely different land route is created—the Pan-American Highway will remain famously incomplete.
So the short answer is simple: you can drive from North America to the edge of South America, and you can drive onward after shipping your vehicle around the gap. But you cannot make the entire journey by car because the only land bridge between the continents contains a roadless, rugged, heavily protected stretch of rainforest known as the Darién Gap.
For this article, I asked Grok to provide me a road map for the journey. Following is Grok’s response:
North-to-South Roadmap (Driving Your Own Vehicle)
Alaska / Canada / US (northern section – unofficial)
Start at Prudhoe Bay (Deadhorse) → Dalton Highway to Fairbanks → Alaska Highway through Yukon/British Columbia to Dawson Creek.
Then multiple options south through Canada and the US (e.g., via Edmonton–Calgary–Denver or Winnipeg–Minneapolis–Dallas routes) toward Texas or California.
These are not officially designated “Pan-American” but form the natural northern extension.
Mexico & Central America (official northern section)
Cross into Mexico (common entry: Laredo, TX → Nuevo Laredo).
Follow Mexican highways (e.g., 85/190) through Monterrey, Mexico City, and south to the Guatemala border.
Continue on the Inter-American / Central American Highway (CA-1) through Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and into Panama.
Ends at Yaviza, Panama (last point reachable by road).
From a typical US southern border crossing to Panama City is roughly 4,000 miles and often takes 2–4 weeks of steady driving (longer with sightseeing/borders).
The Darién Gap – Ship the Vehicle
No road, no reliable car ferry.
Standard overlander method: Ship from Colón / Manzanillo, Panama to Cartagena, Colombia (cargo ship).
Options: Ro-Ro (roll-on/roll-off), shared container, or private container.
Typical cost for a car: roughly US$800–2,500 all-in (varies by method, size, agent, and fees); 1–2 weeks transit common.
You fly (or sometimes sail) separately and meet the vehicle in Colombia.
Agents and specialized overlander services handle paperwork, inspections, and logistics. Prepare documents (registration, insurance, temporary import permits, etc.).
Once in Colombia, the road network resumes and connects most of South America.
South America (southern section)
Starts near Turbo / Cartagena area in Colombia → through Medellín or Bogotá routes south.
Continues via Colombia, Ecuador (Quito), Peru (Lima and coastal/Andean routes), Chile (or into Argentina).
Official endpoint is often considered Buenos Aires; many continue south via Argentine Ruta 40 or other routes to Ushuaia (southernmost city, on Tierra del Fuego — involves a short ferry across the Strait of Magellan in some paths).
High-altitude passes, deserts (e.g., Atacama), Andes, and Patagonia make this the scenic highlight for many.
Practical Notes:
Total time: Pure driving might be several months of daily effort; a realistic full trip with stops, borders, shipping delays, and rest is often 6–18+ months. Minimum recommendations from travelers are around a year for a thorough experience.
Borders & paperwork: Many crossings require vehicle temporary import permits (TIPs), insurance (often country-specific), visas/passports, and sometimes carnets. Rules change — check current requirements per country.
Vehicle & conditions: Most of the route is paved now, but quality varies. 4×4/overland prep helps for side roads, weather, and remote sections. Fuel, services, and safety conditions differ by region (research current advisories).
Alternatives: Fly and rent cars in segments, use buses (possible almost the whole way except the Gap and some remote northern stretches), or ship the vehicle other ways. Most casual travelers do not drive the full route.
Direction: North-to-south or south-to-north both work; seasonality (weather, high passes) often influences choice.
This is the classic “road map” for intercontinental overland travel. Conditions, costs, and logistics evolve, so verify current shipping options, border rules, and safety information before planning.
For a specific starting point, vehicle type, timeline, or more detailed country-by-country breakdown, provide Grok with more details, and it can refine it for you.
The Cows
Here’s an interesting Facebook Reel that explains the point above, though it attributes the whole issue to “the cows.”
This article was created primarily with the help of AI, and the images were generated using Grok.
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rica’s 2026 rainy season is expected to begin withdrawing during the first days of November, though the transition will vary considerably by region.
According to the national weather service, the Instituto Meteorológico Nacional (IMN), the country could experience drier-than-usual conditions before the traditional dates associated with the end of the rainy season.
The change will begin in the North Pacific, including Guanacaste, which is forecast to be the first region to settle into the dry season. The Central Valley and the Central and South Pacific will follow several weeks later, with rainfall likely to continue intermittently through much of November.
Daniel Poleo of the IMN’s Climatology Unit said the transition is not necessarily expected to occur earlier than normal on the calendar. The difference, he explained, is that the shift could be noticeably drier than usual.
“We are expecting it to fall within the normal dates, but the transition could be dry,” Poleo said, according to the report.
North Pacific likely to enter the dry season first
The reduction in rainfall was expected to become more apparent during the second half of October. Between October 26 and November 1, the IMN forecast a particularly dry period in the North Pacific, Central Pacific and Central Valley, while other parts of the country were also expected to record rainfall below historical averages.
During the week of November 2–8, the dry pattern was projected to extend across the country. That development would support the establishment of the dry season in the North Pacific, where communities could see a sustained reduction in rainfall at the beginning of November.
The Central Valley and South Pacific, by contrast, are likely to experience a slower transition. Rainfall could persist across those regions for a significant part of November before declining more consistently.
The expected change will not necessarily mean that storms disappear. Rather, residents may notice fewer rainy days and longer intervals without precipitation. The IMN cautioned that short, intense downpours could continue even as monthly rainfall totals remain below normal.
October rainfall already showing a marked deficit
The shift comes after an unusually dry October in several areas. Weather stations near San José airport in Alajuela recorded a rainfall deficit of nearly 80%, despite October normally being one of Costa Rica’s wettest months.
The IMN’s October 16 climate update projected rainfall declines of up to 60% in the Central Pacific and northern Caribbean by the end of the month. Other regions were expected to see reductions of roughly 40%.
Those figures do not mean that every location remained dry. Much of the country recorded more than 100 millimeters of rain during the first 11 days of October, excluding the Caribbean.
The issue was the uneven distribution of that rainfall: some communities received heavy rain over a few hours, while nearby areas went several days without precipitation.
In Guanacaste, some locations experienced six or seven consecutive dry days. Certain parts of the Central Pacific went even longer without significant rain. The South Pacific also recorded totals below expectations.
Why heavy storms can coexist with dry conditions
The apparent contradiction—intense storms alongside a monthly rainfall deficit—is central to understanding this year’s transition.
According to the IMN explanation, warming associated with El Niño can increase evaporation and contribute to the development of cumulonimbus clouds. These clouds can produce very intense rainfall over short periods.
That pattern can lead to flooding in one community while neighboring areas remain unusually dry. A single storm may cause localized damage, but it does not necessarily erase a broader rainfall deficit accumulated over several weeks.
Recent heavy rain in parts of Heredia and Escazú illustrated that contrast. Other sections of the Central Valley received considerably less precipitation during the same period.
The decline in average rainfall also does not eliminate the risk of flooding. Dry intervals and concentrated storms can occur during the same phase of the season, meaning that reduced rainfall should not be interpreted as a complete end to hazardous weather.
Caribbean and Northern Zone face a different seasonal pattern
The Caribbean and Northern Zone do not have a fixed start date for the dry season in the same way that the Pacific regions and Central Valley do. Their rainfall patterns differ, and precipitation can continue throughout the year.
Even so, the IMN’s outlook for November 2026 through January 2027 projected rainfall roughly 30% below normal in both regions.
The forecast also distinguishes between areas experiencing meteorological drought. The Western Northern Zone, including Guatuso, Los Chiles and Upala, had moved out of drought conditions after receiving substantial rainfall in July and August—months that typically contribute significant precipitation there.
The Pacific regions and Central Valley, on the other hand, continued to show signs of meteorological drought and were expected to maintain conditions more typical of the dry season during the following three months.
Analysis: a dry-season transition, not a clean break
The most important point in the IMN outlook is that Costa Rica will not switch from rain to dryness all at once. The transition will be regional, uneven, and marked by sharp contrasts.
Guanacaste and the North Pacific are likely to feel the change first, while the Central Valley and South Pacific may continue to receive sporadic rainfall into November. The Caribbean and Northern Zone will follow a different rhythm altogether, with no single date defining the end of their rainy period.
The early signs are already visible: extended dry intervals, below-average rainfall totals and a widening gap between communities that experience intense storms and those that receive almost none. For agriculture, water management and disaster planning, that unevenness may matter more than the national average.
Residents should therefore avoid treating the beginning of November as a guarantee of uninterrupted dry weather. A longer dry spell may arrive, yet isolated storms can still produce flash flooding, especially where rainfall falls in concentrated bursts.
The 2026 transition is best understood as a gradual retreat of the rainy season. The first clear shift is expected in the North Pacific in early November, while other regions will move toward drier conditions at different speeds.
Q COSTA RICA — Hundreds of students, professors, university employees, union representatives and politicians took to the streets of San José on Tuesday to protest proposed reductions in funding for Costa Rica’s public universities.
The demonstration, known as the “Gran Marcha Nacional en Defensa de la Educación” (Great National March in Defense of Education), began shortly after 9:30 a.m. at the Fuente de la Hispanidad in San Pedro de Montes de Oca and proceeded toward the Legislative Assembly.
Protesters urged lawmakers to reconsider cuts in the proposed 2027 national budget, warning they could affect scholarships, admissions, research programs, and regional campuses.
The march was organized by the National Council of University Rectors, known as Conare, which represents the Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR)—University of Costa Rica, the Tecnológico de Costa Rica (TEC)—Costa Rica Institute of Technology, the Universidad Nacional (UNA)—National University, the Universidad Estatal a Distancia (UNED)—State Distance University and the Universidad Técnica Nacional (UTN)—National Technical University.
Social organizations, trade unions, political figures and representatives of productive sectors also joined the mobilization.
The immediate trigger was a decision by the Legislative Assembly’s Finance Affairs Commission to cut ¢8.048 billion—approximately US$17 million—from the Special Fund for the Financing of Public Higher Education, or FEES, for 2027. The motion, promoted by the governing Paritdo Pueblo Soberano (PPSO), passed by six votes to five after the ruling party requested that lawmakers reconsider an earlier rejection.
The government intends to transfer the money to the Ministry of Public Education to help cover obligations linked to the pension system for teachers and education workers. The measure must still be approved by the full Legislative Assembly before it becomes part of the 2027 spending plan.
A dispute over access, not only accounting
University leaders argue that the controversy goes beyond the size of the reduction. They also object to the government’s decision not to increase the FEES compared with the previous year, saying stagnant funding could weaken the institutions’ ability to meet rising demand for higher education.
Rectors have warned that the consequences could be felt most sharply outside the Greater Metropolitan Area. Regional campuses serve students who may have no practical alternative to public universities, particularly in communities where relocation to San José would be financially impossible.
Jorge Herrera Murillo, rector of the UNA and president of Conare, said the march aimed to defend educational opportunities for people across the country. The concern is straightforward: when funding is reduced, access may contract first in the places with fewer alternatives.
The universities have also pointed to proposed cuts affecting particular programs, including ¢462 million allocated to scientific Olympiads. The Tecnológico de Costa Rica has warned about possible consequences for its Limón campus, while Education Minister Leonardo Sánchez has disputed those claims and accused the institution’s rector of political pressure. She rejected the accusation.
The political stakes
The protest reflects a broader conflict between the government’s budget priorities and the public universities’ constitutional and social role. Officials appear to be treating the FEES as one potential source of savings within a budget constrained by pension obligations and competing demands.
University leaders, by contrast, describe the fund as a pillar of national development and a safeguard for educational access.
That difference in framing matters. To the government, the cut may represent a reallocation of public money. To students and university authorities, it risks shifting the cost of fiscal pressure onto scholarships, regional campuses and research—areas whose effects may not be visible immediately but can shape opportunities for years.
The presence of former President Luis Guillermo Solís (2014-2018) added political weight to the demonstration. Solís criticized the budget policies of the administrations of Rodrigo Chaves and Laura Fernández, linking the dispute to a larger debate about the direction of public services in Costa Rica.
The University of Costa Rica authorized students, faculty, and administrative staff to attend the march and suspended evaluations between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., with exams and other assessments to be rescheduled. Protests also took place in other parts of the country.
For now, the proposed reduction is not final. It remains subject to debate and approval in the full Legislative Assembly.
That leaves room for negotiations, but it also ensures that the confrontation will continue. The coming debate will test whether lawmakers view public higher education as a budget line to be trimmed—or as infrastructure essential to the country’s social and economic future.
The rectors of the UCR, Carlos Araya Leandro, and of the UNA, Jorge Herrera Murillo, reiterated their willingness to engage in dialogue as the first way to find a solution to the budget cuts affecting public higher education.
They pointed out that defending public higher education goes beyond discussions about university budgets. It’s about guaranteeing access to quality education, strengthening research, community outreach, and knowledge creation, and preserving these institutions’ contribution to the country’s development.
Q COSTA RICA — Crime does pay—right up until the consequences, law enforcement, or betrayal catch up. Such was the case on Monday when Costa Rican investigators seized an arsenal of firearms, millions of colones in cash, luxury vehicles, and a high-value property during a series of raids targeting an alleged informal lending and extortion network in Cartago.
The operation, known as “Caso Laden,” was carried out on October 20 by the Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ), and the Cartago Prosecutor’s Office. Authorities conducted nine searches in Paraíso, Birrisito, Cot and Juan Viñas after an investigation that lasted roughly three years. At least 10 people were arrested.
Investigators said the group, referred to as the “Familia Laden,” allegedly operated a “gota a gota” lending scheme—an informal credit system in which borrowers receive quick loans but face steep interest rates that make repayment almost impossible and aggressive collection practices when debtors fall behind. Authorities are investigating possible links to extortion and money laundering.
Weapons and cash found in a large safe
One of the most significant discoveries was made inside a residence allegedly connected to the group’s suspected leader. Investigators found a safe measuring approximately 1.8 meters in height. Inside were four rifles, a shotgun, a pistol, and about ¢15 million in cash, according to preliminary reports from the OIJ.
A safe contained four rifles, a shotgun, a handgun, and approximately ¢15 million in cash. Credit: OIJ
The seized weapons reportedly included AR-15-style rifles, magazines and ammunition in various calibers. Ballistics experts will examine the firearms to determine whether they may have been used in other crimes.
The combination of weapons and cash has intensified investigators’ focus on the group’s alleged collection methods and internal organization. Authorities say the network may have used violence—including threats, intimidation and gunfire directed at homes—to pressure borrowers and collect debts.
A ¢100 million colones property under investigation
The property attributed to the alleged leader, identified by authorities as 37-year-old José Widier Prieto Medina, is also central to the case. According to the OIJ, the land was reportedly purchased for about ¢100 million in cash. Subsequent improvements included a private gym, an aquarium containing exotic fish, an artificial lake, a terrace equipped with screens and grills, stables, and areas used for maintaining livestock.
A luxurious property in Paraíso de Cartago, attributed to the alleged leader of the organization, featured a private gym, an aquarium, an artificial lake, stables, and expansive recreational areas. Credit: OIJ
The property’s scale and amenities are significant because investigators are examining whether its purchase and development were financed through criminal proceeds. The investigation will need to establish the origin of the money, the ownership structure of the property and whether third parties were used to conceal the assets.
Luxury vehicles and suspected financial growth
The raids also uncovered several high-value vehicles, including a Ford Raptor, a Range Rover and multiple premium motorcycles. Among them was a Ducati with an estimated registry value of approximately ¢18 million.
Authorities are examining whether the vehicles were acquired with funds generated through the alleged lending operation or whether they were held on behalf of other individuals. The vehicles, property and cash may become important evidence in a potential money-laundering case, though the seizures themselves do not establish criminal liability.
Among the vehicles located by the authorities are a Ford Raptor, a Range Rover, and high-end motorcycles—including a Ducati with a registered value of ₡18 million. Credit: OIJ
According to the investigation, the alleged network may have moved between ¢40 million and ¢50 million per month through informal loans. The group reportedly offered loans ranging from ¢300,000 to ¢5 million, charging high interest and using coercive tactics when borrowers failed to pay.
OIJ acting director Michael Soto said Prieto Medina had worked repairing computers four or five years ago before experiencing a sharp increase in wealth. That change in his financial circumstances is now being examined alongside property records, bank transactions and corporate documents.
An alleged organization with defined roles
Investigators believe the broader structure included approximately 12 principal members, assigned to roles such as placing loans, collecting payments and managing money. Authorities are also examining the possible use of commercial companies, nominees and bank accounts belonging to third parties to acquire property and other assets.
The group’s alleged identity markers have added another unusual detail to the investigation. Prosecutors say the suspected leader may have required members to tattoo the word “Laden,” particularly on the neck, as a symbol of affiliation.
The arrests and seizures represent an important step in the case, but they are not the final determination of what happened. Prosecutors must still connect the assets to specific criminal conduct, establish who controlled the money and demonstrate how the alleged network operated. The detained individuals will be placed at the disposal of the Public Prosecutor’s Office while financial, patrimonial and ballistic analyses continue.
Analysis: Why the asset trail matters
The case illustrates how investigations into informal lending networks can extend well beyond the original complaints from borrowers. A “gota a gota” operation may begin with small, short-term loans, but its financial footprint can expand into property, vehicles, cash holdings and layers of informal enforcement.
The most important evidence may not be the luxury property or the weapons considered separately. It may be the connection among them: alleged high-volume lending, coercive debt collection, rapid accumulation of wealth and assets purchased with cash. Prosecutors will likely try to reconstruct that chain through bank records, phone communications, property documents, vehicle registrations and testimony from borrowers or former members.
The alleged monthly turnover—between ¢40 million and ¢50 million—would help explain how a lending operation could support major purchases, but revenue alone does not prove that the money came from illegal activity. Investigators will need to distinguish between legitimate loan repayments, unreported income, and funds generated through extortion or other crimes.
The firearms could also broaden the case. If ballistic testing links any of the weapons to shootings or threats, the investigation could move beyond financial crimes and informal lending into a wider prosecution involving violence. If no such links are found, the weapons may still support allegations that the organization maintained the capacity to intimidate borrowers and enforce its debts.
For now, the case remains at the investigative stage. The seizures reveal the scale of the assets under scrutiny, but the courts will ultimately determine whether those assets were connected to criminal conduct and whether the arrested individuals are responsible for the alleged network.
Q COSTA RICA — Attorney General Carlo Díaz will remain at the helm of the Fiscalía (Public Prosecutor’s Office) for another four years. All 21 magistrates present at Monday’s plenary session voted to keep Díaz in office.
His new term will run until October 2030, extending his leadership of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which he has headed since October 2022.
The vote provides Díaz with a clear institutional mandate. It also places the prosecutor at the center of a broader struggle over the limits of political power in Costa Rica, where investigations involving senior officials have sharpened tensions between the executive branch and the country’s judicial institutions.
Díaz has drawn criticism from the administrations of President Laura Fernández and her predecessor, Rodrigo Chaves, particularly after prosecutors opened cases involving alleged campaign-finance violations and the possible misuse of public funds. Chaves, who later became a government minister, publicly attacked Díaz and at one point led supporters in a march demanding his resignation.
The reelection therefore carries significance beyond the personnel decision itself. By retaining Díaz unanimously, the Supreme Court signaled that the Public Prosecutor’s Office should be allowed to pursue politically sensitive cases without direct executive approval.
That does not settle the conflict between the prosecutor and the government, but it does make the court’s position difficult to portray as narrowly divided or procedurally fragile.
During the session, Díaz used his presentation before the magistrates to defend the independence of the institution. He said the Public Prosecutor’s Office must remain a pillar of the rule of law and warned against political efforts that could weaken the separation of powers. He also reaffirmed his commitment to investigating organized crime, corruption and drug trafficking while respecting the rights of defendants and victims.
During his appearance, he presented a report on his first term and answered questions about criminal prosecutions, cooperation with international agencies and the backlog of cases. Several magistrates cited his work against organized crime and his defense of prosecutorial autonomy when explaining their votes.
Over the next four years, Díaz will have to manage pressure from the executive branch while pursuing cases that may affect powerful political actors. He will also face demands for measurable results against organized crime, which has become one of Costa Rica’s most urgent security concerns, alongside expectations that prosecutors handle sensitive investigations with greater transparency and procedural discipline.
For the Chaves-Fernández government, the reelection is a setback, as its objective was to replace a prosecutor it considered confrontational. For the opposition and judicial-sector defenders, it is evidence that the country’s institutional checks remain capable of resisting political pressure. The sharper question is whether that institutional confidence can survive sustained conflict once new investigations reach the courts.
Díaz’s second term begins with unusually strong backing from the magistrates but little guarantee of political calm.
His reelection gives him security of tenure until 2030. It also gives the executive branch and the public a clear benchmark: whether the prosecutor can turn that mandate into effective, impartial enforcement without allowing the office to become another front in Costa Rica’s increasingly polarized politics.
Lawyer with a 28-year judicial career
Carlo Díaz has a judicial career spanning more than 28 years, four of which he has spent at the helm of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Díaz joined the Judiciary in 1998 and has since held various positions, including assistant prosecutor, staff prosecutor, and deputy prosecutor. He also headed regional prosecutor’s offices in Limón, Pavas, Desamparados, Heredia, Alajuela, and Cartago, and served as deputy prosecutor for Indigenous Affairs, the Office for the Execution of Sentences, and the Prosecutor’s Office Management Unit.
He holds a law degree from the University of Costa Rica and a master’s degree in Law with an emphasis on Criminal Law, in addition to studies in Criminology. On a personal level, he is a father, a grandfather, and an avid cyclist.
DEA supported the reelection of Carlo Díaz
Díaz revealed that officials from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) expressed their support for him to remain at the helm of the Public Prosecutor’s Office—and to continue their collaborative work—ahead of today’s vote.
Díaz said that the head of the DEA in Costa Rica, whose identity is not being disclosed for security reasons, told him directly that he hoped he would be re-elected, citing the trust they have built and the various projects they are working on side by side.
Chaves on Carlo Díaz’s reelection: “It doesn’t surprise me”
Crhoy.com reports that former President and currently the Minister of the Presidency and Finance, Rodrigo Chaves, reacted to the reelection of Carlo Díaz. Ahead of a meeting with the President of Congress, Yara Jiménez, Chaves told the Trivisión that the reelection did not surprise him.
“I am not the least bit surprised (by the reelection); he is an individual who faces serious questions and clearly lacks the capacity, the character—everything required—to be an effective Prosecutor General,” Chaves stated.
Chaves has consistently voiced strong criticism of Díaz, who has investigated alleged corruption cases both during Chaves’s administration and under the current administration of Chaves—Fernández.
Q COSTA RICA — The Fiscalía General (Office of the Attorney General), in collaboration with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other international agencies, has set new, high-level targets in the fight against transnational organized crime.
They will now pursue “invisible drug traffickers” and public officials who collaborate with drug trafficking operations, explained Attorney General Carlo Díaz following his reelection on Monday.
Having concluded a “first phase”—which focused on the pursuit and capture of traditional drug traffickers and criminal structures already identified locally—the joint strategy has evolved into a far more complex level of investigation.
This cooperation between the Fiscalía and foreign authorities has now entered a second operational phase. This new stage centers on pursuing and dismantling so-called “invisible drug traffickers”—a term borrowed from Colombian terminology to describe criminals who operate from the shadows of power rather than from the streets.
The targets in this second phase include individuals who hold positions of significant economic power or wield strong political influence within society.
These individuals maintain a facade as successful businesspeople, hiding behind ostensibly legitimate enterprises and activities. This allows them to move within high-level circles without being directly linked to drug trafficking.
In addition to these powerful figures, this investigative phase directly targets public officials and political figures who, through acts of corruption, collaborate with or facilitate the operations of these transnational criminal networks.
These individuals do not fit the traditional profile of a street-level criminal; instead, they appear as “successful businesspeople” or political figures who operate under a veneer of legality to conceal their ties to drug trafficking and engage in money laundering.
The capture of Guobin Tam Zhang, a Costa Rican of Chinese descent, also known as Juan Carlos Tam—who moved within the political circles of the ruling party, Partido Pueblo Soberano (PPSO—is a reflection of that change in direction, according to Díaz.
Jasmina López and her daughter Valeska Valdez lost their lives following an attack at their home. (From social media)
Q COSTA RICA — A woman identified as Xiomara stated that she received a phone call from a man—who is now the primary suspect in the murder of a mother and her 10-year-old daughter in Liberia, Guanacaste—in which he allegedly asked her to notify the police so they could recover the bodies from the home where the incident took place so they wouldn’t decompose.
This statement was captured by Noticias Trivisión in an interview conducted after the victims were discovered in their home.
According to Xiomara’s account, the conversation took place around 3:00 p.m. “He had already called earlier to ask that the bodies be collected so they wouldn’t decompose, but no one believed him,” she recounted.
According to her, the perpetrator asked her to contact the police—specifically requesting that at least three patrol units be sent—to recover the victims. The suspect insisted that the authorities needed to be notified. “He said that if I didn’t believe him, then he would have to call the Fuerza Pública [national police] himself—but he asked me to do him a huge favor and make the call instead,” she stated.
The man stated that he would not return to the home.
During the conversation, Xiomara asked him where he was. According to her account, the suspect replied that he was no longer at the residence and had gone far away.
She asked if he had left Costa Rica. “I haven’t left the country—I’m still in the country—but I’m very far away, and I’m not going back there,” the individual responded.
Woman and 10-year-old daughter found dead
According to local media, including CRHoy.com, the alleged attacker—identified as Antonio Rafael Valdez Garcia, a Nicaraguan national—attacked Jasmina López and a minor, Valeska Valdez, with a machete before fleeing the scene.
Jasmina López and her daughter Valeska Valdez lost their lives following an attack at their home. (From social media)
The man being sought is believed to be the woman’s romantic partner and the girl’s father.
Antonio Rafael Valdez Garcia. Image from social media
The woman and her 10-year-old daughter were found dead on Saturday, October 17, inside a home in the Bella Vista neighborhood, near the “Puente de Lata” (Tin Bridge) in Liberia, Guanacaste province. Both had sustained multiple stab wounds.
In a video, the Director General of the Fuerza Pública, Raúl Rivera Bonilla, announced that an operation is underway “across the entire country with the goal of capturing the assailant and handing him over to the appropriate judicial authorities.”
Costa Rican Red Cross personnel arrived at the scene after receiving a report and confirmed that both victims were already dead. According to information published by Teletica, both had sustained multiple injuries.
History of domestic violence within the family
In the aforementioned interview with Noticias Trivisión, Xiomara stated that the couple had been dealing with a situation of violence for nearly four years.
“They had been living with domestic violence for four years,” she declared.
She noted that people close to the victim were aware of the conflicts in the relationship, though she added that the woman had asked them not to involve the police. “You cannot call the police; this is between us—him and me—no one else should get involved,” he reportedly said.
This account will need to be verified by investigators, who have not yet released an official hypothesis regarding the motive for the attack. It is also unknown whether there were any formal complaints, protection orders, or prior interventions by state institutions concerning potential domestic violence.
Authorities have issued an alert at border crossings in case he attempts to leave Costa Rica.
Q COSTA RICA — A 22-year-old woman surnamed Ortiz remains at large as the primary suspect in the homicide of American Mark Walter Fleming, which took place on September 27 in Playas del Coco, Guanacaste.
On Friday, October 16, the Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ) arrested another woman in Desamparados for her alleged role in transporting Ortiz to San José following the crime.
Raids began at 5:00 a.m. in the areas of La Capri and San Miguel, in Desamparados. The woman arrested has been identified as Roxana Zeledón; she remains in police custody while authorities determine her legal status, according to reports from Teletica.
The investigation indicates that Ortiz, known by the alias “Panterita” and who allegedly works as an escort and is the primary suspect, had direct contact with Fleming inside an apartment belonging to the victim, located in a beachside condominium complex in Playas del Coco. Investigators hypothesize that the woman left the property alone and departed in a light vehicle.
The financial trail between Guanacaste and San José
Fleming’s credit cards were used after his death to make purchases and pay for lodging at various locations throughout Guanacaste. These transactions helped reconstruct part of the route taken by the two individuals under investigation.
The journey began in Playas del Coco, where charges were recorded following the homicide.
The suspects allegedly spent the night in Flamingo, and the last recorded transaction took place near Abangares, before they traveled toward San José.
Investigators located a vehicle of interest at the condominium complex where Zeledón resides, in Desamparados. They suspect it was used to pick up Ortiz in Guanacaste and transport her to San José.
Fleming was 74 years old, originally from California, and lived in a condominium in Playas del Coco. The OIJ ruled the death a homicide after determining that Fleming sustained multiple blows to the head with the glass jar of a blender.
The businessman had founded Fleming Metal Fabricators and served as vice president of the company—based in San Clemente, California—which specializes in the manufacturing of vehicle bodies and trailers. His social media posts also indicated an interest in sport fishing.
Authorities are investigating whether the women frequented tourist areas in Guanacaste to make contact with foreigners, and whether those interactions are related to the case. This line of inquiry emerged from sources close to the investigation.
Surveillance footage released by OIJ shows a woman (left) sought in connection with the homicide of a 74-year-old American in Playas del Coco
International coverage of the homicide in Costa Rica
The murder of Fleming was also covered by Fox News, the New York Post, and the British tabloid, the Daily Mail, which published images of the primary suspect—released by the OIJ—as well as photographs of the area where the crime took place.
The British tabloid used the term “bikini killer” to refer to Ortiz.
The search remains focused on locating the suspect.
If you have any relevant information or recognize the primary suspect still at large, Costa Rican authorities urge the public to contact the OIJ’s confidential tip line at 800-800-0645.
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rican authorities identified seven women as possible victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation during a raid on a bar and restaurant in Sámara, Guanacaste, officials reported.
The operation took place on the night of October 15 at Bar Restaurante La Jefa, according to Costa Rica’s immigration service, the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería (DGME). The women identified at the premises are Nicaraguan and Dominican nationals, though officials did not specify their ages, places of origin, immigration status, or the number from each country.
A Dominican-born woman who later obtained Costa Rican citizenship was arrested on suspicion of managing the alleged operation. Authorities identified her by the surnames Cabrera Durán. Investigators allege that she used her contact with foreign women seeking employment and higher incomes to recruit them.
According to the immigration police, the women were allegedly working without the minimum labor protections required under Costa Rican law and providing sexual services in exchange for money. Investigators are examining whether the administrator received a portion of the earnings through electronic transfers sent to her telephone number using SINPE, Costa Rica’s national electronic payment system.
Officials said the alleged contacts with the Dominican women may have been arranged through friends and relatives in the Dominican Republic. Cabrera Durán reportedly traveled there frequently. Authorities have not disclosed how the Nicaraguan women were allegedly recruited.
Cabrera Durán’s arrest does not constitute a finding of guilt. Her potential criminal responsibility will be determined through the judicial process.
Immigration police identified seven suspected victims of human trafficking at a bar-restaurant in Guanacaste. (Image from 100% Noticias)
The authorities have not said whether the seven women received specialized assistance, were placed under institutional protection, or were put in contact with the consular authorities of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. Officials also did not announce whether additional people are being investigated.
Costa Rican authorities urged the public to report suspected human-trafficking cases confidentially through the 911 emergency system or the immigration service at 2106-4005.
Prostitution in Costa Rica
The exchange of sex between consenting adults is not prohibited, yet activities surrounding it—including pimping, trafficking and the commercial sexual exploitation of children—are criminal offenses.
That legal distinction has helped create a highly visible adult-sex industry while leaving authorities, advocates and communities to confront persistent concerns about coercion, abuse and exploitation.
Costa Rica’s reputation as a tourist destination has long drawn visitors from abroad, and the country’s sex industry has developed alongside its hotels, bars, nightclubs and entertainment districts.
The legal framework is often misunderstood. Although prostitution itself is not criminalized, Costa Rican law prohibits third-party involvement that profits from or facilitates another person’s prostitution.
The sexual exploitation of minors is illegal, and authorities have repeatedly warned that a child cannot consent to commercial sex.
Q COSTA RICA — An officer from the Unidad Especial de Apoyo (UEA—Special Support Unit—an elite police unit that belongs to the Directorate of Specialized Units of the Fuerza Pública (National Police) was detained after being found with a cell phone and other electronic devices inside the La Reforma prison complex, where he was assigned to guard Alejandro Arias Monge—alias “Diablo”—one of the country’s most notorious alleged drug trafficking leaders.
The officer was identified as Maiker Guzmán Charpantier; his duties also included guarding Jonathan Pérez Méndez—alias “Tan”—another alleged criminal ringleader held in the maximum-security area.
The officer had bypassed the checkpoints where staff are required to leave their electronic devices before entering the prison facilities. Suspicion of a possible irregularity prompted an inspection of Guzmán’s belongings.
The search led to the confiscation of a Huawei mobile phone, a Huawei smartwatch, a portable battery, a SIM card, four USB-C cables, and two charging adapters.
When questioned, the police officer claimed he had forgotten to leave the electronic devices in the lockers designated for personal belongings.
The detainee was no ordinary officer; he had a familial connection to Eduardo Guzmán López—known as “Inca”—a member of the Unidad Especial de Intervención (UEI)—Special Intervention Unit—an elite police special forces unit administratively attached to the Ministry of the Presidency, who served in security and advisory roles in the protection of former president Rodrigo Chaves.
For clarity, the father and son both serve in elite Costa Rican police units. The father is assigned to Casa Presidencial, while the son serves with the Ministry of Public Security.
So far, there have been no reports of the father’s involvement in the events under investigation.
“Diablo”
The security measures surrounding “Diablo” are once again under scrutiny.
The arrest comes while Alejandro Arias Monge remains held at the Centro Nacional de Atención Específica—known as the “Maximum Security” unit—following his capture last July and is expected to be moved to the newly inaugurated Centro de Alta Contención contra el Crimen Organizado (CACCO)—Costa Rica’s new maximum-security prison—while awaiting possible extradition to the United States.
Questions
This incident raises further questions regarding the control mechanisms intended to prevent electronic devices from entering prisons, particularly in areas housing individuals under investigation for leading criminal organizations.
For now, the investigation must determine whether this was merely a breach of entry protocols or if there was a deliberate intent to facilitate unauthorized communications within the penitentiary.
It has also revived scrutiny of the security networks surrounding former president Rodrigo Chaves and the degree to which family, access and institutional power intersect inside the state’s security apparatus.
Analysis
The detainee’s connection to his father’s role in the presidential security makes the case politically difficult to dismiss as an isolated prison incident. That background gives the detention broader significance. Costa Rica is not merely confronting a suspected breach of prison protocol. It is being asked to demonstrate that appointments, family ties and proximity to political power do not place anyone beyond scrutiny.
During Chaves’s presidency, questions emerged around the role of security personnel close to the executive branch, including allegations of irregular surveillance and discussion of a proposed group intended to pursue “Diablo.”
For Chaves, who left office as president and was appointed Minister of Finance and Minister of the Presidency on May 8, 2026, the episode is an unwelcome reminder that the conduct of officials and advisers associated with his administration will continue to shape public judgments about his government. A president is not legally responsible for every alleged act committed by a former employee’s relative. Still, administrations are judged by the systems they build, the people they empower and the safeguards they establish around sensitive operations.
In the style of Chaves, which seems to be adopted by the current president, Laura Fernánxez, the temptation will be to reduce the matter to a sensational headline: a police officer, a cellphone and a notorious inmate.
That would miss the larger concern. The credibility of Costa Rica’s security institutions depends on showing that the same rules apply inside the prison, inside the police, and inside the presidential orbit.
Until the investigation establishes more, the allegations must remain allegations. Yet the detention has already exposed a serious governance test—one that reaches from a prison checkpoint in Alajuela back to the security structures associated with the Chaves administration.
The Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ) arrested early this Friday morning, following a raid in San Miguel de Desamparados, a woman as part of an investigation into the homicide of a 74-year-old American man in Playas del Coco, Guanacaste.
The woman in custody, identified by the surnames Zeledón Abarca, was arrested because investigators believe she accompanied the main suspect and drove a vehicle used in connection with the crime.
However, the primary suspect in the murder of Marc Walter Fleming, who was found dead in his apartment on September 27, remains at large. Authorities have not publicly released her identity.
The security footage shows the suspect accompanied by another woman outside the victim’s apartment
The elderly man’s body showed injuries to his head. Investigators suspect that the woman used the glass pitcher of a blender to strike him; the resulting injuries proved fatal.
The OIJ is also investigating the theft and subsequent use of the victim’s credit cards. This line of inquiry is part of the investigation into the possible motive for the homicide.
Residents of the condominium reported hearing shouting from inside the home. Security camera footage captured images of the primary suspect, allowing authorities to track her movements.
The suspect, who has made headlines in international media such as Fox News, the New York Post, and the Daily Mail, referring to the woman as the “Bikini Killer”, is fair-skinned, thin, and has black hair. She is approximately 1.60 meters (5’3″) tall.
The OIJ’s investigation to locate the primary suspect is ongoing.
The OIJ Confidential Information Center can be contacted at 800-800-0645 to report information about the woman’s whereabouts.
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rica’s government is seeking to shift public attention away from unanswered questions about the apparent proximity of businessman Guobin Tam Zhang to senior figures in the ruling party, the Partido Pueblo Soberano (PPSO).
Tam, whom Costa Rican authorities have described as a suspected drug-trafficking money launderer, was arrested in October during a joint operation involving the Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ), the Policia Constrol de Drogas (PCD) and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
The arrest brought renewed scrutiny to photographs showing Tam at two private events attended by prominent government supporters. One image placed him among guests at a February electoral celebration for the ruling Chavista movement at San José’s Aurola Hotel. Another showed him seated near then-President Rodrigo Chaves, President-elect Laura Fernández and several PPSO legislators during an April event in the Cristo Rey neighborhood.
The April gathering was held to inaugurate a building connected to Obras del Espíritu Santo, a charitable organization led by Catholic priest Sergio Valverde, and to mark Costa Rica’s National Cooperative Day. The event also included Freddy González, secretary-general of the PPSO and one of the country’s most visible cooperative movement leaders.
Neither the government nor the ruling party has provided a clear explanation of how Tam gained access to the events, who invited him or why he was permitted to sit near senior political figures. Mayuli Ortega, president of PPSO, said the party was examining how Tam attended the February celebration. Ten days later, there was still no public account of the findings.
The government has offered no comparable investigation into the April event. Obras del Espíritu Santo said it did not know in what capacity Tam attended and denied responsibility for organizing the gathering. González has not publicly explained his contact with Tam or the businessman’s presence at the event.
Fernández addressed the issue at a news conference on October 7, after several days of public criticism. She denied having any relationship with Tam and argued that a photograph or brief encounter could not establish a connection to criminal activity. She also said it would have been impossible for her to know the businessman’s alleged criminal background.
Yet one of her statements was later challenged by the available record. Fernández said Tam had not been the subject of a criminal investigation in February, when the Aurola photograph was taken. The article reports that a judicial case involving him had already been active since January.
The president also explained a separate encounter with another man suspected of money laundering, identified as Hugo Barboza, detained earlier this month. She said the conversation took place during a March concert after event organizers extended a courtesy to her. Fernández did not offer a similar explanation for Tam’s presence at the party gathering.
After a second photograph of Tam was published by La Nación, the government again declined to provide detailed answers. Nogui Acosta, the PPSO’s legislative leader, defended the official position, saying that attending a public event or appearing in a photograph with someone does not prove a relationship with that person’s activities or knowledge of possible wrongdoing.
That response addresses the narrowest question—whether a photograph proves criminal complicity—but leaves broader institutional questions unanswered. Political parties and government officials routinely vet guests, donors, organizers and participants at restricted events. The issue is not simply that Tam appeared in a picture. It is whether anyone responsible for organizing or securing those gatherings knew who he was, whether he had political or financial ties to the ruling movement, and whether officials took reasonable steps to identify such risks.
Fernández has not announced an inquiry into whether Tam contributed money to electoral activities outside official campaign accounts or supported mobilizations associated with the governing movement. The PPSO has opposed creating a legislative commission focused specifically on Tam’s activities. Instead, its lawmakers backed a broader investigation into campaign financing in 2022 and 2026—a proposal that could examine more actors but may also dilute attention on the immediate questions raised by the photographs.
The government has also emphasized its record on combating organized crime. Fernández said the “Tam case” was already before the courts and expressed support for the continued presence of the DEA in Costa Rica. That statement was presented as evidence of the administration’s commitment to cooperation against drug trafficking, though the article notes that the DEA has operated in Costa Rica since 1985, rather than having arrived during Chaves’s presidency.
At the same time, the administration has promoted the opening of the High-Containment Center Against Organized Crime, known as Cacco. The facility has become a centerpiece of the government’s security messaging. Its inauguration was promoted days before the ceremony through government-produced audiovisual material, helping the administration redirect public discussion toward its anti-crime agenda while questions about Tam remained unresolved.
Analysis: The problem is political access, not just photographic proximity
The government’s defense rests on a technically plausible claim: being photographed near a suspect does not, by itself, establish criminal conduct. That point is difficult to dispute. Public events create accidental encounters, and political figures cannot know the full background of every person who appears in a crowd.
But the government’s response is incomplete because it treats the controversy as though the only question were whether Fernández or other officials personally knew Tam’s alleged activities. The more consequential issue concerns access.
Tam was not photographed once in an anonymous public crowd. He appeared at two politically significant events, including one where he was seated near high-ranking officials and lawmakers. Those repeated appearances raise questions about invitations, accreditation, introductions and relationships. They also call for a basic institutional review, even if that review ultimately finds no illegal conduct.
The administration’s refusal to pursue that review creates a credibility problem. Saying that “a photograph proves nothing” may be legally correct, but it does not explain why the same individual appeared in multiple settings connected to the governing movement. Nor does it clarify whether party officials, political intermediaries or event organizers knew him before his arrest.
The choice of a broad campaign-finance investigation produces a similar ambiguity. A wide-ranging inquiry could uncover useful information, but it can also make accountability less direct. By placing the Tam questions inside a much larger review of the financing of multiple campaigns and parties, legislators avoid giving the public a focused answer about the people and institutions that gave him access.
The government’s communications strategy has been more decisive than its fact-finding. Public attention has been directed toward the newly inaugurated prison, the Centro de Alta Contención contra el Crimen Organizado (CACCO)—High-Security Center for Combating Organized Crime, cooperation with the DEA and the administration’s broader anti-narcotics message. Those are politically useful subjects, particularly for a government that has made security a central part of its identity. They do not resolve the unanswered questions about political proximity.
The ongoing judicial and extradition proceedings may eventually clarify Tam’s alleged financial and criminal networks. Authorities are investigating suspected links to drug-trafficking organizations in Colombia and Mexico and alleged efforts to legitimize proceeds from the drug trade. Those proceedings should be allowed to run their course without political interference.
Still, judicial proceedings are not a substitute for political accountability. Courts determine criminal liability. Parties and public institutions must also explain whom they invite, how they vet access to restricted events and what they do when a person connected to their circles is arrested on serious charges.
For now, the government appears to be betting that the controversy will fade as other headlines take over. That may work as a short-term communications tactic. It does not answer the central questions.
Until the PPSO and the executive branch identify how Tam entered those events, who facilitated his access and whether any money or political assistance passed through those relationships, the photographs will remain more than isolated images. They will stand as evidence of an unresolved failure of transparency.
Adapted from “Gobierno intenta dejar atrás cuestionamientos por cercanía con sospechoso de narcotráfico seguido por la DEA” at SemanarioUniversidad.com. Read the original in Spanish here.
04/02/2026, Costa Rica, San Jose, Casa Presidencial, Zapote. Conferencia de prensa con la presencia de Rodrigo Chaves, presidente de la Republica, y Laura Fernandez, presidenta electa y nombrada por Chaves como Ministra de la Presidencia. Ademas estuvo presente todo el gabinete del actual gobierno. (GDA via AP Images)
Q COSTA RICA — Legislator Antonio Trejos Mazariegos has filed a criminal complaint against President Laura Fernández and former President Rodrigo Chaves over the appointment of Pablo Esteban Martínez Bertozzi as director of the country’s intelligence service, the Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad Nacional (DIS).
The complaint, submitted on October 15 by the Frente Amplio (FA) party legislator, asks the Attorney General’s Office to determine whether the appointment violated legal requirements for senior police positions. Martínez Bertozzi took office on June 1, 2026.
The dispute centers on a requirement in Article 65 of Costa Rica’s General Police Law. The provision states that directors of certain police bodies must hold at least the rank of commissioner. According to a response issued by the Presidential Office, Martínez Bertozzi does not hold a police rank.
Trejos argues that the appointment could constitute the crime of illegal appointments under Article 344 of the Penal Code. He is asking prosecutors to investigate the roles played by Fernández, Chaves, and other officials involved in preparing, reviewing and approving the appointment documents, as well as whether they knew the candidate did not meet the statutory requirement.
Government defends the appointment
The government has acknowledged that Martínez Bertozzi has no police rank but maintains that his appointment was lawful. The executive branch has cited Article 62 of the General Police Law and Article 4 of the DIS’s organizational regulations.
Those provisions allow the agency’s directorate to be occupied by a professional in a relevant field or by someone whose technical experience and suitability in security qualify them for the position, according to the administration’s argument. Martínez Bertozzi is a lawyer and previously served as a presidential adviser during Chaves’s administration. Infobae
Trejos disputes that interpretation. His central argument is that an administrative regulation cannot eliminate or replace a condition established by statute. The complaint therefore asks prosecutors to establish whether the legal provisions cited by the government can support the appointment and whether legal opinions or technical reports were prepared before the decision was approved.
Records raise additional questions
The complaint also refers to a September 4 document from the Ministry of Public Security listing officials who hold at least the ranks of commissioner or commander. Martínez Bertozzi reportedly does not appear on that list.
Trejos is asking the Attorney General’s Office to obtain an official certification clarifying whether Martínez Bertozzi held the rank of commissioner when he assumed the DIS position. If such a rank was granted or recognized, prosecutors are also being asked to determine when it occurred, which authority approved it and what legal reasoning supported the decision.
The lawmaker has not asserted that a police rank was granted to Martínez Bertozzi through a special procedure. He has asked prosecutors to investigate whether that happened.
Analysis: a legal test for executive discretion
The case presents a narrow but important question: how far can the executive branch rely on professional experience and regulatory language when a statute appears to impose a formal qualification?
The government’s position rests on the distinction between a political appointment and a technical eligibility requirement. Directors of government agencies may be appointed and removed at the president’s discretion, but that discretion normally operates within the limits imposed by law. The fact that a position is one of free appointment does not automatically mean that every candidate is legally eligible.
That distinction is likely to shape the investigation. If Article 65 is interpreted as an absolute requirement, the absence of a commissioner’s rank could undermine the appointment regardless of Martínez Bertozzi’s professional background. If the government’s interpretation of Article 62 and the DIS regulations prevails, prosecutors may conclude that the law permits a qualified civilian professional to lead the agency.
The 2024 decree adds another layer. If officials formally granted Martínez Bertozzi a qualifying rank, the legality of that action could become as important as the original appointment. Prosecutors would have to examine whether the decree was consistent with the General Police Law, whether the required technical recommendations existed and whether the executive authorities acted within their legal powers.
At this stage, the complaint is an allegation, not a finding of criminal responsibility. The Attorney General’s Office must still decide what investigative steps to take and whether the available documents justify further proceedings. The case will turn on the wording of the relevant laws, the administrative record and any evidence showing what Fernández, Chaves and other officials knew when the appointment was approved.
For the government, the dispute is a challenge to its interpretation of executive appointment powers. For the opposition, it is a test of whether statutory requirements can be bypassed through regulations or executive action. The outcome could affect not only Martínez Bertozzi’s tenure but also the rules governing who may lead Costa Rica’s intelligence and security institutions.
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rica is debating legislation that would prohibit minors under 15 from creating and maintaining accounts on certain social media platforms, intensifying a regional debate over how governments should protect minors online.
The proposal, identified as legislative file 25.805, comes amid growing concern about cyberbullying, grooming, harmful content, social pressure, and excessive digital use. Supporters argue that younger children may not yet have the maturity to recognize or manage these risks, and that social media companies should bear greater responsibility for protecting them.
Yet experts warn that establishing a minimum age would not, by itself, guarantee children’s safety. The Fundación La Casa de los Niños argues that many of the same dangers exist outside conventional social media. Children can encounter strangers, harassment, manipulative content and inappropriate material through video games, websites, messaging services and audiovisual platforms, including spaces that do not require users to create an account.
That observation goes to the heart of the debate. A ban may close one door, but it does not necessarily remove the risks on the other side.
Two legislative approaches
Costa Rica’s lawmakers are considering more than one approach to digital protection. The proposal establishing a minimum age of 15 would restrict access to accounts on designated social networks. A separate initiative, previously discussed in the Legislative Assembly, would prohibit social media accounts for children under 14 while imposing additional obligations on platforms and families.
That second proposal would require parental controls for younger users, prohibit personalized advertising aimed at minors and demand stronger age-verification systems for adolescents between 14 and 18. It would also seek to disable features associated with compulsive use, including infinite scrolling, autoplay and recommendation systems driven primarily by user engagement, according to Infobae.
These details reveal an important shift in the policy discussion. The question is no longer only whether children should be allowed to access social media. It is also whether platforms should be required to change the systems that keep users online, target them with advertising and recommend content.
The enforcement problem
The practical challenge is age verification. Any law based on a fixed age threshold would need a reliable way to determine who is using a service. Requiring official identification could create new privacy concerns, while weaker systems could be easily bypassed.
Young users may also turn to false birth dates, shared accounts, virtual private networks or less-regulated services. If access is pushed underground, parents and guardians may have less visibility into what their children are doing online.
That concern has appeared in international discussions. Experts cited by Infobae have warned that prohibition can make risks less visible rather than eliminating them. Adolescents who are blocked from mainstream platforms may seek alternative services or use devices without adult supervision.
The issue is especially difficult because digital spaces are not neatly separated. A child may move from a social network to a multiplayer game, a private messaging group, a livestreaming service or a website with embedded social features. A law aimed at a list of named platforms could quickly become outdated as companies adjust their products or users migrate elsewhere.
Protection requires more than a ban
The Fundación La Casa de los Niños has called for a broader strategy combining regulation, digital education, family support and corporate accountability. That approach recognizes that children need more than an access restriction. They need help identifying manipulation, misinformation, scams and abusive behavior, as well as clear ways to report harm and obtain assistance.
Families also need support. Parents are often expected to monitor online activity even though platforms change rapidly and their safety tools vary widely. Effective policy would need to give caregivers practical guidance while respecting adolescents’ privacy and growing independence.
The responsibility of technology companies is another central issue. Platforms design the recommendation systems, notifications and advertising models that shape how minors experience the internet. Age limits may restrict who enters, but they do not automatically make the environment safer for those who remain.
A broader regional forum held in Costa Rica reached a similar conclusion. Experts from Panama, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador called for an inclusive debate involving children and adolescents, families, governments and technology companies. They also emphasized that rules should account for differences in users’ circumstances, abilities and access to support.
A measure that may help—but cannot solve the whole problem
A minimum-age rule could still have value. It might delay children’s entry into platforms designed around engagement and provide a legal basis for demanding stronger safeguards from companies. It could also give parents and schools a clearer standard to follow.
But its success would depend on how it is implemented, enforced and combined with other measures. Restrictions that are easy to evade may create a false sense of security. Rules that rely on intrusive identification systems could threaten privacy. Policies that focus only on access may leave untouched the algorithms, business models and forms of abuse that create many of the dangers in the first place.
Research suggests that restrictions can reduce certain harms while displacing others. Some young people may move toward more private or difficult-to-monitor spaces, while children with stronger family support and better digital skills may benefit more than those without them.
Costa Rica’s debate therefore reflects a larger policy choice. Legislators can present a ban as a clear response to public anxiety, but protecting minors requires a system that is harder to summarize: age-appropriate design, enforceable corporate duties, privacy safeguards, digital education, family guidance and accessible support when abuse occurs.
The proposed age limit may become one part of that system. It is unlikely to be enough on its own.
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rica’s geology places a natural limit on the size of earthquakes the country can generate, according to seismologist Marino Protti of the Observatorio Vulcanológico y Sismológico de Costa Rica (Ovsicori)—Costa Rican Volcanological and Seismological Observatory.
An earthquake measuring magnitude 8.0 would generally require a fault capable of rupturing across an area roughly 200 kilometers long and 50 to 60 kilometers wide. No known geological structure within Costa Rica reaches those dimensions, Protti told El Observador.
The country’s largest identified fault lies beneath the Nicoya Peninsula. It extends for about 100 kilometers and is approximately 60 kilometers wide—substantial enough to produce a major earthquake, but not large enough to generate a magnitude-8.0 event under the estimates cited in the report.
That does not mean Costa Rica is protected from powerful earthquakes. Regions including Guanacaste, the southern Pacific coast and the southern Caribbean could experience earthquakes above magnitude 7.0. The potential depends on the length and width of the rupture zone, as well as the amount of energy accumulated beneath the surface.
Smaller faults can still cause serious damage
The faults beneath the Central Valley and around Cartago are considerably smaller. Many measure between five and 10 kilometers, although some extend to roughly 15 kilometers. Their estimated maximum magnitudes generally fall between 6.0 and 6.5.
Those numbers should not be mistaken for a measure of safety. A magnitude-6 earthquake occurring near a city and at shallow depth can cause severe damage, particularly when buildings are vulnerable or local soils amplify the shaking.
This is one of the most important points in Costa Rica’s earthquake risk. Magnitude measures the energy released by an earthquake, but it does not describe the full extent of its consequences. Depth, distance from populated areas, ground conditions and construction quality can all determine whether an earthquake becomes a disaster.
A smaller rupture close to an urban center may therefore be more destructive locally than a larger, deeper earthquake farther away.
Osa Peninsula remains a closely watched area
The Osa Peninsula is among the regions receiving particular attention from seismologists. Geodetic measurements have identified a section beneath the peninsula that appears to be accumulating strain. The area should be moving, but remains largely locked.
Based on scientific research, that zone could produce an earthquake between magnitude 7.2 and 7.4. Ovsicori uses satellite-based monitoring stations to measure ground movement, map areas of deformation and estimate the size of a possible rupture.
The findings can indicate where energy is accumulating and how large an earthquake might be. They cannot determine the date or time of the event.
That distinction matters. Seismologists may identify a zone with elevated earthquake potential, but no monitoring system can currently provide an exact prediction of when a particular earthquake will occur.
The lesson from Nicoya
The 2012 Nicoya earthquake reached magnitude 7.6 but caused no deaths, according to the report. Protti attributed that outcome in part to local soil conditions and Costa Rica’s earthquake-resistant construction practices.
The event illustrates why magnitude alone is a poor measure of human impact. The same numerical magnitude can produce very different results depending on where the rupture occurs, how deep it is, how close it lies to populated areas and how well buildings withstand shaking.
Costa Rica’s apparent inability to generate a magnitude-8.0 earthquake should therefore not be interpreted as an absence of seismic danger. The country’s geological structures may limit the maximum size of an earthquake, but the faults that do exist are capable of producing destructive events—especially shallow earthquakes near communities.
The practical implication is straightforward: earthquake preparedness should focus less on the pursuit of a single headline number and more on local exposure. Monitoring active faults, enforcing resilient construction standards and preparing communities in areas such as Osa, Nicoya, Guanacaste and the Central Valley remain essential.
Costa Rica may not possess a fault large enough to produce a magnitude-8.0 earthquake. It still has more than enough seismic activity to demand serious preparation.
Professional boxer Ziggy Myrie Samudio has secured a new sponsorship agreement with Peptides Costa Rica, marking another development in his growing career and bringing additional private-sector attention to Costa Rica’s boxing community.
The agreement brings together a young athlete working to establish himself in professional boxing and a Puntarenas-based business seeking to support emerging national talent.
For Samudio, the announcement follows a recent victory that added momentum to his professional journey. For Peptides Costa Rica, the partnership represents an opportunity to become involved in local sports while recognizing the determination and commitment required to compete at a professional level.
A Promising Boxer Making His Mark
Ziggy Myrie Samudio has been steadily gaining experience in professional boxing, competing against international opponents and developing his skills in one of the most physically demanding sports.
His recent performance in Guanacaste provided another encouraging result.
During a boxing event held in October 2026, Samudio faced Mexican fighter Pedro Jorkaef Montiel Litzon in a super welterweight contest.
The Costa Rican boxer secured a second-round technical knockout victory, adding another win to his professional record.
The result highlighted his competitive abilities and represented an important step in his continuing development.
For emerging professional boxers, victories like these can help build experience, attract attention, and create opportunities for future fights.
Samudio’s progress also reflects the dedication required to compete in professional boxing, where success depends on consistent training, technical improvement, and the ability to perform under pressure.
Why This Sponsorship Matters
Professional boxing is a sport in which individual athletes often carry significant responsibilities beyond their performance inside the ring.
Training programs, coaching, travel arrangements, equipment, and competition preparation all contribute to the demands of maintaining a professional career.
For athletes still establishing themselves, securing commercial partnerships can be an important part of their development.
The agreement with Peptides Costa Rica introduces a new sponsor into Samudio’s professional journey.
According to the company, the partnership is intended to support his sporting ambitions and increase awareness of his career both nationally and internationally.
Financial terms and the duration of the sponsorship have not been disclosed.
The announcement also reflects a broader opportunity for Costa Rican businesses to participate in the development of local athletes through sponsorship relationships.
From Jacó to the National Sporting Community
While much of Costa Rica’s business and sporting activity is concentrated around the Greater Metropolitan Area, companies operating in coastal communities can also contribute to national initiatives.
Peptides Costa Rica is headquartered in Jacó, Puntarenas, a Pacific coast destination known for tourism, local commerce, and its growing business community.
The company’s decision to sponsor Samudio connects a Jacó-based business with a professional athlete seeking to expand his presence in competitive boxing.
Peptides Costa Rica says the partnership reflects its appreciation for discipline, perseverance, and long-term commitment.
These qualities are central to Samudio’s sporting ambitions as he continues preparing for the challenges of professional competition.
The sponsorship is a commercial partnership supporting the athlete’s career and should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the company’s research products for athletic use.
The Road Ahead for Ziggy Myrie Samudio
For a professional boxer, every fight contributes to a larger career story.
Experience against different opponents, improvements in technique, and the ability to adapt under pressure can all influence an athlete’s progression.
Samudio’s recent technical knockout victory provides a positive result as he continues working toward further opportunities.
The new sponsorship may also help bring greater public attention to his career.
Although no upcoming fight dates or specific future events were announced as part of the agreement, the boxer remains focused on his professional development.
Fans interested in following his training activities, boxing appearances, and future announcements can find updates through his official Instagram account, @ziggymyrie.
A Look at the Company Behind the Partnership
Peptides Costa Rica operates from Jacó, Puntarenas, and specializes in distributing research-grade peptides and related materials intended for scientific and laboratory applications.
The company serves researchers, laboratory professionals, and authorized purchasers within Costa Rica.
Its product information includes technical specifications and supporting documentation, such as batch-specific certificates of analysis.
Through its online catalog, customers can review available research materials and obtain information about product categories, pricing, and local distribution.
The company emphasizes that its products are intended exclusively for scientific research and laboratory use.
They are not approved for human or veterinary consumption or for diagnosing, treating, curing, or preventing medical conditions.
Additional company information is available through the Peptides Costa Rica website.
A Partnership Built Around Opportunity
The agreement between Ziggy Myrie Samudio and Peptides Costa Rica brings attention to the role businesses can play in recognizing emerging sporting talent.
For the boxer, it represents another partnership as he works to strengthen his professional career.
For the company, it offers an opportunity to support a Costa Rican athlete whose sporting journey reflects persistence, preparation, and ambition.
As Samudio looks toward his next professional challenges, the newly announced sponsorship adds another chapter to his developing boxing career.
While the longer-term impact of the partnership remains to be seen, the announcement illustrates how local business involvement can contribute to the visibility of Costa Rican athletes pursuing opportunities in professional sports.
RICO’s Q — Costa Rican President Laura Fernández said her government will examine El Salvador’s proposal to grant conditional early release to some prisoners linked to criminal gangs, while stopping short of criticizing President Nayib Bukele’s domestic policies.
Fernández made the comments on October 14 during the inauguration of Costa Rica’s new Center for High Containment Against Organized Crime, or CACCO, in San Rafael de Alajuela, built inside the La Reforma prison complex, to hold up to 5,100 inmates.
Asked about Bukele’s plan and allegations of arbitrary arrests during El Salvador’s state of exception, Fernández declined to pass judgment on the Salvadoran government. “I don’t usually comment on public policies that are decisions made by other presidents in the region,” she said.
She added that she would review the proposal with her team during a meeting scheduled for Friday, in El Salvador, with Bukele and members of his administration.
“If there is something valuable, given that they have given us so much cooperation, we will study it,” Fernández said. She also expressed hope that Costa Rica could bring back “even more positive things” that might benefit the country.
Bukele announced the proposed release mechanism policy on October 13, a day before our Presidenta announced her idea.
Bukele’s—now Laura Virginia’s—proposal would reportedly focus on prisoners who were not central participants in violent crimes. Bukele said the measure could apply to roughly half of the prisoners linked to gang structures.
The Salvadoran president presented—as Laura Virginia will also do—the proposal as an attempt to distinguish between violent gang members and people who assisted criminal organizations under pressure or coercion. Bukele cited the example of young people who warned gang members when security forces were entering neighborhoods under their control.
Fernández’s response carries particular weight because Costa Rica’s new high-security prison was modeled on El Salvador’s approach. The CACCO drew on the design and security principles donated by Bukele, of El Salvador’s Center for the Confinement of Terrorism, known as CECOT.
While Doña Laura takes the credit for the CACCO, former president Rodrigo Chaves worked with the Salvadoran government to study its prison model and receive technical assistance.
Fernández’s comments reflect a careful political calculation. Costa Rica is willing to accept Salvadoran technical assistance and borrow elements of Bukele’s prison infrastructure, but the president has avoided publicly endorsing every part of El Salvador’s security strategy.
That distinction matters. A high-security facility is an institutional tool: it can be presented as a way to isolate dangerous prisoners, improve prison control and prevent criminal organizations from operating behind bars. A mass conditional-release program raises a different set of questions about evidence, due process, supervision and public safety.
Bukele’s proposal is still incomplete. The Salvadoran government has not explained how prisoners would be assessed, what legal safeguards would apply, how violations would be handled or what agencies would supervise those released. We can be assured that Bukele will have all his t’s crossed and i’s dotted before any implementation. Can’t say the same for the current administration in Costa Rica.
For Costa Rica, the issue is also about political identity.
The country has traditionally emphasized democratic institutions and legal protections while facing growing pressure to respond to organized crime.
The central question is not whether Laura Virginia will establish independent leadership or strictly emulate El Salvador’s security model.
The line sets up a sharp contrast between imitation and leadership. It suggests that Costa Rica is at a crossroads: Laura Virginia may be tempted to borrow from El Salvador’s model, but copying another country’s approach is not the same as solving Costa Rica’s own problems.
The real challenge, then, is whether she can develop a distinct political vision and take responsibility for it rather than simply follow a path someone else has already made.
While President Fernández explicitly rejects the label of “bukelization” and asserts her focus is on Costa Rica’s distinct economic stability, media outlets and opposition groups highlight her campaign promises of “mano dura” (iron fist) policies and mega-prisons as proof of heavy Salvadoran influence.
Laura Virginia denies copying Bukele; however, analysts from Global Finance and Agence France-Presse note that she won the February 2026 election largely by echoing the Salvadoran President’s right-wing populist rhetoric.
Political opponents argue that Laura Virginia’s proposed constitutional reforms and anti-crime measures run the risk of mirroring El Salvador’s centralization of executive power. They view her narrative as an attempt to diminish the traditional checks and balances of the Legislative Assembly and erode the nation’s historically robust democratic institutions.
Q COSTA RICA — Costa Rica’s economy continues to grow, but at a significantly slower pace than that recorded a year ago. The Monthly Economic Activity Index (IMAE) showed a year-on-year change of 2.2% in August 2026—a slowdown of 3.4 percentage points compared to the same month in 2025, according to data released by the Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR).
The report reveals uneven performance across the country’s various productive sectors. While activities such as construction, commerce, and financial services maintained positive results, the manufacturing sector posted negative figures, and companies operating under special regimes experienced a marked loss of momentum.
According to the Central Bank, national production saw an average year-on-year growth of 3.4% through August, though the figure for the final month analyzed fell below that average.
The primary reason for this slowdown lies in the performance of the “special regimes”—a category that includes companies benefiting from specific incentives and unique operating conditions, such as those located in free trade zones (zonas francas).
These companies recorded a year-on-year growth rate of just 0.7%, a sharp decline compared to the significantly higher figures seen throughout 2025.
In contrast, companies under the “definitive regime”—which encompasses a large portion of productive activities geared toward the domestic market—grew by 3.2%.
This disparity highlights the contrast between the weakening of certain manufacturing activities linked to foreign trade and the greater dynamism seen in sectors such as construction, commerce, and domestic services.
Free trade zones and special regimes lose momentum
One of the most significant findings in the report concerns the performance of companies operating under “special regimes”.
Their output saw a year-on-year increase of just 0.7% in August—a slowdown of 15.3 percentage points compared to the same month in 2025.
According to the Central Bank, this trend is primarily driven by a decline in manufacturing activity, specifically in the production of medical supplies and electronic components.
Throughout 2025, the medical device industry experienced exceptional export growth, which created a high baseline for comparison against this year’s figures.
Compounding this was the cessation of operations by companies that manufactured electronic components and circuit boards; the impact of these closures began to show up in economic indicators as early as the final quarter of 2025.
As a result, the special regimes contributed only 4.7% to the total growth in national output recorded in August.
Q COSTA RICA — Authorities in Costa Rica are investigating the killing of Marc Walter Fleming, a 74-year-old U.S. citizen who had lived in the coastal community of Playas del Coco, in Guanacaste province.
The Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ) said the crime occurred on the afternoon of Sept. 27 inside the condominium where Fleming lived in Playas del Coco, a community in the Sardinal district of Carrillo. Investigators later found his body with apparent head injuries believed to have been caused by a blunt object.
A blender glass may have been used as the weapon. The suspect allegedly fled the scene.
Police are seeking a woman who is considered a suspect in the case. OIJ investigators said Fleming entered the condominium with the woman, who later left the property. Authorities have released video footage showing the woman and are asking the public for information that could help identify and locate her.
Fleming was a retired businessman who had moved to the Playas del Coco area in search of a “quiet, relaxed life” after leaving the United States, according to information cited by La Teja.
His relationship with the woman remains under investigation.
Authorities have not publicly identified the suspect or confirmed details about her connection to Fleming.
The OIJ is urging anyone who recognizes the woman or has information about the case to contact its confidential hotline at 800-800-0645.
The case has unsettled Playas del Coco, a popular beach community in Guanacaste that attracts tourists, retirees, and expatriates. Some residents and expat groups are now asking whether the area has become increasingly dangerous for older foreigners who live alone.
Fleming’s death is not the first case to raise concerns about violent or targeted crimes involving tourists and retirees.
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A retired U.S. citizen who moved to Costa Rica seeking a “quiet, relaxed life” is dead after what authorities are calling a brutal attack inside his own luxury condominium in Playas del Coco.
The victim was identified as Marc Walter Fleming, 74. According to the OIJ, the Judicial Investigation Organization, Fleming invited a young woman described as an alleged “lady of the house” to his condo. She had reportedly traveled from the Central Valley area, possibly San José.
Investigators say the woman allegedly struck Fleming on the head during an encounter inside the residence. Reports indicate a blender glass may have been used as a weapon. The suspect then fled the scene.
As of now, the OIJ is conducting a nationwide search for the woman, who remains at large and is considered a person of interest in Fleming’s homicide.
A Growing Concern in Tourist Zones
The case has shaken Playas del Coco, a popular beach town in Guanacaste known for expats and tourists. Local residents and expat groups are asking the same question: has the area become riskier for older foreigners living alone?
Costa Rica markets itself heavily on eco-tourism and adventure, but authorities and health officials have long warned about another side of tourism. A significant portion of visitors contribute to the sex tourism market.
Public health data also shows Costa Rica faces challenges with sexual health. The country has reported one of the highest rates of STDs in Central America in recent regional health reports, which officials link to party tourism, and lack of consistent prevention outreach in high-traffic zones like Guanacaste and Jaco.
This is not the first time authorities have warned about targeted and violent crimes involving tourists and retirees. The U.S. State Department currently lists Costa Rica under a questionable Level 2 Travel Advisory when in reality, it’s the most dangerous country in Central America.

If you are a resident or visitor, pexercise caution, meet people in public places first, and report suspicious activity.
No officials have released further details about a motive and the investigation is ongoing.
If you have information about the suspect, contact the OIJ directly..
Q Costa Rica — Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele did not attend the opening Wednesday of Costa Rica’s new maximum-security prison, despite being invited to the ceremony and having helped inspire the facility’s design.
The Centro de Alta Contención contra el Crimen Organizado (CACCO)—High-Containment Center Against Organized Crime—was inaugurated on Oct. 14 at the La Reforma prison complex in San Rafael de Alajuela. Costa Rican President Laura Fernández led the ceremony.
Bukele’s absence had been anticipated but not officially confirmed before the event. Costa Rican immigration records showed that neither the Salvadoran president nor Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella, who had also been invited, had entered the country by Wednesday morning.
Bukele last visited Costa Rica on Jan. 13, when he joined then-President Rodrigo Chaves for a ceremony marking the beginning of construction and helped lay the prison’s foundation stone. That visit didn’t go very well when the planned laying of the foundation stone went sideways.
Bukele’s January visit, which took place shortly before Costa Rica’s presidential election, drew criticism from opposition parties that described it as foreign interference. Costa Rica’s Supreme Elections Tribunal allowed the visit but warned foreign delegations not to intervene in domestic politics, according to The Tico Times.
The Salvadoran government donated the plans for the facility, which was modeled in part on El Salvador’s aggressive campaign against gangs and organized crime.
The CACCO can hold up to 5,100 inmates—roughly one-fifth of Costa Rica’s current prison population. The government says the facility will house people convicted of serious crimes, including drug trafficking, homicide and contract killings. The first inmate transfers are expected to take place at the end of October.
Costa Rican officials have presented the prison as a response to a sharp rise in killings and the growing influence of organized crime. Justice Minister Gabriel Aguilar has said the facility is intended to help the state regain control of a prison system that authorities believe has been penetrated by criminal groups.
Bukele’s security policies have made him a prominent figure in the regional debate over crime and incarceration. His government’s crackdown is widely credited with reducing gang violence in El Salvador, though human-rights organizations have accused authorities of arbitrary arrests, due-process violations and weakening democratic safeguards.
The Salvadoran president’s absence was not the only notable feature of the ceremony. Senior judicial officials, including the attorney general and representatives of the Supreme Court and the OIJ, also did not attend. Fernández highlighted the empty seats during her remarks and criticized members of the judicial system who, she said, opposed the government’s tougher approach to crime.
The missed appearance underscored the political sensitivity surrounding the prison.
Even without Bukele at the ceremony, the connection between his security model and Costa Rica’s new prison was clear. The CACCO is one of the Fernández government’s most visible efforts to adopt a harder line against organized crime as the country confronts a worsening wave of violence.
Q COSTA RICA — You send out invitations. Spruce the venue. Spend hours getting everything ready. Then you wait. At some point, the first guests start to arrive. But none of the special guests, the ones that establish that the party is real, never show. Without them, the gathering remains a sad arrangement.
That was the case on Wednesday when the Judiciary branch of government, those responsible for the catching the criminals and incarcerating them, and whose operational budgets are under attack by the central government, decided, en masse, not to show up to the official opening of the Centro de Alta Contención y Crimen Organizado, known as “CACCO”, at the La Reforma penitentiary complex in San Rafael de Alajuela.
None of the senior judicial officials identified in the invitations attended, leaving seats reserved for them empty during the event. The reported absences included Attorney General Carlo Díaz, Judicial Investigation (OIJ) Director Michael Soto and members of the Supreme Court.
President Laura Fernández drew attention to the empty seats at the beginning of her remarks. “Greetings to the magistrates… Ah, I’m told they didn’t come,” she said.
The president later accused members of the judiciary of turning their backs on what she described as Costa Rica’s most urgent national problem: public security. She also alleged that some magistrates, judges and prosecutors were siding with criminals, intensifying a dispute that has already centered on the government’s hard-line approach to organized crime and incarceration.
The criticism was echoed by Rodrigo Chaves, the former president and current minister of the Presidency and Finance. During the ceremony, Chaves described the empty seats as a symbol of what he characterized as the judiciary’s failure to support the state’s security responsibilities.
“Today—though it may seem paradoxical to many—I greet the empty chairs that Doña Laura [Fernández] set out here for the members of the Court and the Judiciary,” he stated.
The event was largely attended by members of the governing party, the Partido Pueblo Soberano party and the Cabinet, as well as some mayors and diplomats.
The absence of judicial officials also raised questions about institutional coordination.
The government has argued that the country’s security crisis requires close cooperation among investigators, prosecutors, judges and prison authorities.
The judiciary’s nonattendance, whether motivated by political disagreement, scheduling or concerns about the event, was not publicly explained in the reports available Wednesday.
In July, the government also questioned the absence of representatives from the judiciary at a session of the National Public Security Council. On that occasion, the judiciary also challenged budget cuts proposed by the Ministry of Finance—a proposed ¢10 billion direct cut accompanied by a push to freeze an additional ¢30 billion for the 2027—warning of their potential consequences for criminal investigations, judicial proceedings, and the provision of support to victims.
President Fernández’s spin on the absence was to accuse the members of the Judiciary of siding with criminals.
The ceremony therefore became more than a prison opening. It turned into a public confrontation over how Costa Rica should respond to organized crime—and over whether the country’s institutions can work together despite sharp disagreements about security policy, due process and the separation of powers.
The CACCO
The CACCO occupies approximately 31,000 square meters inside the La Reforma prison complex. The project, which began in January, was presented by the government as a central part of its response to organized crime and rising violence. Construction cost approximately US$35 million.
The first transfers to CACCO are expected to take place at the end of October, with the facility’s capacity to expand gradually until it reaches approximately 5,100 inmates.
The Ministry of Justice, the government agency that oversees prisons, said the facility is expected to reach full occupancy by December 2026.
Q24N — Anyone searching for “Nicaragua” on Google today will encounter a definition that the regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo cannot control. In the information panel that appears alongside the search results, the “Government” section describes the country as a dictatorship and an authoritarian state.
Q Costa Rica verified this by conducting a direct search. Under the “Information” heading, Google provides basic facts about the country, including its capital, currency, official language, land area, and telephone country code. The “President” field lists Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, reflecting the co-presidency the couple established through Nicaragua’s 2025 constitutional reform.
The most striking detail is how Google classifies the government. It lists five categories: dictatorship, republic, authoritarianism, unitary state, and presidential system. The first and third labels reflect what international organizations, experts, and opposition groups have been condemning for years.
A Label Seen by Millions
Google is the world’s most widely used search engine. For students, tourists, investors, and journalists researching Nicaragua, its information panel is often the first source they encounter.
The summary it displays is based on publicly available reference materials—not from official propaganda.
By describing Nicaragua as a dictatorship, Google’s information panel challenges the image the regime tries to present abroad. It does so before a global audience, including people who may know little about the country’s ongoing crisis.
Google’s classification is not an isolated judgment. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2025 Democracy Index gave Nicaragua a score of just 1.97 out of 10. The country ranked 150th out of 167 countries and territories, placing it in the category of “authoritarian regimes.”
Within Latin America and the Caribbean, it sits at the very bottom of the list—ranking even lower than Cuba and Venezuela.
Since 2018, the regime has imprisoned and exiled political opponents, stripped hundreds of Nicaraguans of their nationality, shut down thousands of civil society organizations and media outlets, and confiscated property. These actions have led various governments and human rights organizations to label the country a dictatorship.
For millions of Google users, Nicaragua is no longer being presented as merely a troubled democracy or an authoritarian government. It is identified plainly and directly: a dictatorship.
RICO’s Q — I came across this personal critique of urban life, regional prejudice, and moral superiority in Costa Rica: “La superioridad moral del GAM: vivir en un gallinero y creerse Suiza (The moral superiority of the GAM: living in a chicken coop and thinking you’re Switzerland).
This text is a personal critique of urban life, regional prejudice, and moral superiority in Costa Rica by Reddit user ‘UnoMasDelMontonCR’ on the Ticolandia subreddit, an online community on Reddit dedicated to topics surrounding Costa Rica.
It begins with a reflection on Heredia’s transformation from a predominantly agricultural area into a densely developed part of the Greater Metropolitan Area, or GAM. From there, it expands into a broader argument about how certain forms of social and political superiority persist even as the country changes.
At the center of the text is a contrast between two ideas of progress. On one side, there is the conventional view that progress means more construction, better connectivity, more housing, and greater urban development. On the other, there is the writer’s lived experience: more traffic, noise, pollution, bad smells, stress, and less peace. The disappearance of the coffee fields is therefore not presented as a simple story of modernization. It is also a story of what has been lost.
The opening establishes the writer’s personal connection to this transformation. Heredia is not described abstractly, as a statistic or an urban-planning case study, but as a place remembered through coffee plantations and a slower way of life. That memory is important because it gives the criticism emotional weight. The writer is not merely complaining about traffic; they are comparing the present with a place that once felt more familiar and tranquil.
The text also addresses regional prejudice. The references to people from Heredia, Guanacaste, the coasts, and Nicaragua point to a hierarchy of belonging in which residents of the Central Valley are sometimes treated as more educated, sophisticated, or genuinely Costa Rican than people from rural, coastal, or border regions. Expressions such as “nicas regalados” (‘Nicaraguans given away’, used in Costa Rica as a xenophobic and regionalist insult primarily directed at people from the Guanacaste province) reveal how national identity can be used as a tool of exclusion. The phrase implies that some people are less deserving of respect or belonging because of where they come from.
This is one of the strongest aspects of the argument: the writer exposes the contradiction between claims of civilization and the prejudices used to define who supposedly belongs to civilized society. A person may have an urban address, a professional title, or a prestigious job, yet still hold deeply provincial ideas about people from other parts of the country. The text suggests that geographic centrality does not automatically produce broader thinking. In some cases, it may simply give existing prejudices more confidence.
The criticism of the GAM is therefore not only about infrastructure. It is also about identity and social attitudes. The metropolitan area becomes a symbol of a particular kind of status: proximity to institutions, employment, education, political discussion, and cultural influence. The writer argues that some residents convert that status into a sense of moral or intellectual superiority. They look down on rural life while ignoring the costs of their own urban environment.
Traffic functions as the clearest symbol of this contradiction. The writer lives only a few kilometers from work, yet the trip can take between fifteen and thirty minutes. Traveling by motorcycle reduced the commute, but rain and exhaustion eventually made that option unsustainable. This small anecdote makes the larger point concrete: urban development has not necessarily made daily life easier. A city can have more roads, buildings, businesses, and vehicles while still failing to provide its residents with a genuinely better quality of life.
The phrase “las maravillas de la civilización de la GAM” (the wonders of the GAM civilization) is deliberately sarcastic. It reverses the usual meaning of civilization. Instead of clean streets, efficient transportation, and public comfort, the writer associates metropolitan civilization with congestion, pollution, noise, and unpleasant smells. The sarcasm works because it exposes the distance between the language of progress and the reality of ordinary life.
The text then shifts from urban development to politics, though it does so with an explicit acknowledgment that this is a digression. That transition may seem abrupt, but it is conceptually consistent. In both cases, the writer is criticizing people who claim moral superiority while failing to examine their own contradictions.
The political section focuses particularly on selective empathy. The writer does not reject human rights, due process, psychological care, or the possibility of rehabilitation. In fact, the text explicitly recognizes that these principles matter. The concern is that public discussions sometimes appear to give more emotional attention to offenders than to victims and their families. The writer sees this as a distortion of moral priorities, especially when the suffering of victims fades from view while the rights and circumstances of perpetrators remain central.
This argument is emotionally powerful, but it is also the point at which the text becomes most vulnerable to criticism. The relationship between protecting victims and protecting the rights of suspects or convicted offenders is not necessarily a zero-sum competition. Due process, humane treatment, and police accountability are not favors granted to criminals; they are safeguards intended to prevent abuse and protect everyone. A society can recognize the devastation caused by violent crime while also insisting that state power be exercised lawfully.
The writer does acknowledge this principle, but the surrounding language places greater emphasis on frustration than on distinction. References to the “poor little angel” in prison and to people who seem more concerned about a suspect’s discomfort are intentionally provocative. They communicate the writer’s anger effectively, but they also simplify a complicated debate. Someone who questions police conduct is not automatically indifferent to victims, just as someone who demands harsh punishment is not automatically indifferent to human rights.
Still, the emotional logic of the passage is clear. The writer is responding to what they perceive as an imbalance in public compassion. Victims and their families often receive attention immediately after a tragedy, but their suffering can disappear from public discussion as debates shift toward the offender, the legal process, or institutional responsibility. The text asks readers to remember that behind every crime are real people whose lives may be permanently altered.
The connection between this issue and the GAM is metaphorical rather than direct. The metropolitan area represents a concentrated social environment in which political arguments, institutional debates, and claims of moral sophistication take place. The writer believes that some people become so absorbed in these debates that they lose contact with ordinary concerns: safety, peace, family, community, and the basic desire to live without constant stress.
This idea appears in the description of people trapped in political “bubbles.” The bubble is both ideological and geographic. It is made up of social circles, media habits, professional identities, and assumptions about what constitutes an informed opinion. People inside the bubble may see themselves as defenders of democracy, rights, or civilization, while failing to understand how their arguments sound to those dealing with crime, traffic, insecurity, or economic pressure in everyday life.
The text’s rural-versus-urban contrast should not be read as entirely literal. The writer does not seriously claim that every rural area is peaceful or that every metropolitan resident is arrogant. In fact, the text includes several qualifications: not everyone thinks this way, and people who live in the GAM without looking down on others are not the target. These qualifications prevent the argument from becoming a total condemnation of urban residents.
Even so, the contrast is intentionally exaggerated. Rural areas are associated with calm, space, and authenticity, while the GAM is associated with congestion, contamination, and self-important people. This is partly a rhetorical strategy. By presenting the two environments in opposition, the writer makes the reader feel the absurdity of judging people as backward simply because they live outside the Central Valley.
There is also an important irony in the fact that the writer lives in the GAM. The criticism is not delivered from a position of complete distance. The writer is part of the system being criticized and admits it directly: “I also live in the GAM.” This self-inclusion gives the text credibility. It suggests that the argument is not “those people are bad,” but rather “I am surrounded by conditions and attitudes that I also experience.”
The final paragraphs clarify the text’s intended audience. The writer is not attacking everyone who lives in the metropolitan area. The target is the person who treats geography, education, employment, or political identity as proof of personal superiority. The message is essentially: if you are content with your life and respect people from other regions, there is no reason to feel attacked.
That clarification also reveals the post’s conversational and defensive character. It reads like a social-media publication written to provoke discussion, not like a formal essay. The profanity, slang, jokes, and references to defecating while discussing politics create an informal voice that feels distinctly personal. Words such as “mae,” “bretear,” “jalarme,” and “mierdero” reinforce the Costa Rican setting and make the text sound like spoken language rather than polished commentary.
The crude language serves several purposes. It conveys anger, keeps the text from sounding academic, and undermines the very kind of self-serious superiority the writer criticizes. The writer is not presenting themselves as a detached expert. They are speaking as someone irritated by traffic, hypocrisy, pollution, and condescension. That voice gives the post energy, though it may also alienate readers who would respond better to a more measured argument.
The update about “superioridad lingüística” (linguistic superiority) extends the central theme into language. Commenters apparently focused on the grammatical mistake of writing “el GAM” instead of “la GAM,” and the writer responds sarcastically by mocking their need to correct the post. This is more than a joke about grammar. It illustrates the same pattern the text has criticized throughout: people using a minor marker of correctness to establish superiority over others.
The update is also self-aware. The writer admits that an artificial-intelligence tool helped with the spelling but failed to catch the grammatical error. Rather than hiding the mistake, they turn it into another example of the behavior they dislike. The implication is that some readers ignored the larger argument because they preferred to identify a small error and display their own knowledge.
At the same time, the update introduces an interesting contradiction. The writer criticizes people for focusing on correctness, yet the original text itself depends heavily on distinctions—between civilized and uncivilized, victim and offender, urban and rural, empathy and hypocrisy. The post rejects one form of judgment while making plenty of judgments of its own. That does not invalidate the argument, but it shows how difficult it is to criticize superiority without reproducing some of its habits.
Overall, the text is best understood as a frustrated reflection on status. It asks what makes someone civilized, educated, or morally superior. Is it living in the country’s economic center? Having a university degree? Working in a respected profession? Speaking in the language of institutions and rights? The writer’s answer is skeptical. None of these things necessarily makes a person wiser, kinder, safer, or happier.
The deeper argument is that quality of life cannot be measured only through development, urban density, or proximity to power. A person living outside the GAM may have less access to certain services or opportunities, but may also enjoy time, space, community, and peace. A person living in the metropolitan area may have greater material access while spending hours commuting, breathing polluted air, and living under constant pressure. Neither reality should be romanticized, but neither should rural life be dismissed as inherently inferior.
The text is strongest when it exposes the contradiction between the language of progress and the experience of daily life. It is also effective in showing how regional prejudice can coexist with claims of sophistication. Its weaker points are the broad generalizations about political groups and the tendency to frame concern for defendants’ rights as though it necessarily comes at the expense of victims. Those sections would benefit from more precision.
Even with those limitations, the post succeeds as a provocative social critique. Its central question is simple but uncomfortable: if metropolitan life produces so much stress, congestion, pollution, and arrogance, why should people outside the GAM be treated as though they are the ones living badly?
The final answer is not that rural life is automatically better or that the GAM has no advantages. It is that no place, profession, education level, or political identity gives anyone the right to look down on other people.
A person’s location may shape their opportunities, but it does not determine their intelligence, dignity, or value. And sometimes, the person who appears to be living “behind the times” may simply be living with more peace than the people who claim to be ahead.
Read the original post and text (in Spanish) here.
RICO’s Q — “You cannot enter…You are not permitted to enter Nicaraguan territory.” On this basis, the Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo regime has imposed an ironclad migration barrier, banning, turning away, or expelling 110 Costa Rican citizens.
Journalists, academics, activists, lawyers, and even tourists are digitally profiled and tracked on social media by the regime’s intelligence services so that their entry can be flatly blocked at borders and airports.
Key points regarding the migration blocks:
Refusal at borders and airports: Cases involving designer Frank Agüero, journalists Juan Diego Ramírez and Adrián Quirós, and professor Carlos Sandoval demonstrate how authorities block entry simply because individuals hold dissenting views or are practicing their professions.
Paranoia and state terror: Professionals such as lawyer Joseph Rivera—who was denied entry and subjected to baseless investigation while handling a femicide case—describe the profound fear of arbitrary detention or enforced disappearance on Nicaraguan soil.
Alarming official silence: Despite the scale of the documented abuses, Costa Rica’s Foreign Ministry and the Office of the Ombudsman have adopted a passive stance, downplaying the flagrant violations of their nationals’ freedom of movement.
As I have noted before, the Ortega-Murillo regime has increasingly used immigration controls to exert political and administrative power. Recent reports document restrictions on foreign visitors, as well as cases in which Nicaraguan citizens were barred from returning home after traveling abroad.
The denial of entry to Costa Ricans looks less like an isolated bureaucratic dispute and more like part of a wider system in which immigration decisions can be made with limited transparency. The justification—national security—gives authorities broad discretion while leaving travelers with few practical means to challenge a border decision.
The central question is whether Nicaragua’s action will remain limited to specific groups or become a formal restriction affecting Costa Rican nationals more broadly. No publicly documented evidence establishes a permanent, universal ban on all Costa Ricans entering Nicaragua.
That ambiguity may be intentional. A formal ban would invite a clear diplomatic response and could damage commerce. Selective refusals are harder to measure and easier for authorities to defend as individual security decisions.
For travelers, the practical lesson is simple: valid documents and confirmed reservations may not guarantee admission. For businesses, the episode is a warning that political risk—not just transportation capacity or customs paperwork—now has to be factored into cross-border planning.
The border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua has long been more than a line on a map. It is a route for tourists, workers, families, and goods. When access becomes unpredictable, the damage reaches far beyond the travelers turned away at the gate.
On a personal note, I was denied entry to Nicaragua in 2022. No specific reason was provided, though my conversations with a senior immigration official at the border were connected to my association with Q Costa Rica. On that day, I was politely turned away, told I would be allowed to enter the country, and escorted back to the border to cross back into Costa Rica.
Do you think the Costa Rican state should break its silence and demand explanations from the dictatorship regarding the refusal of entry to its citizens?
Q COSTA RICA — Supermarket purchases, buying food at a local shop, and paying for a hotel stay are among the transactions reportedly made by the woman suspected of murdering an American man in Playas del Coco, Guanacaste.
The Orgamismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ) is tracking her movements following the victim’s death.
According to the investigation, the woman—a resident of San José—is the prime suspect in the homicide of an elderly American man named Fleming, which took place at a condominium in Sardinal de Carrillo.
Inquiries suggest the suspect used a glass blender jar to strike the victim multiple times.
Authorities have been tracking her movements and attempting to locate her since September 27. Information gathered indicates that the woman entered the property with the American man, later left alone, and got into a passenger vehicle.
After the crime, she used the victim’s credit cards to make various purchases, which allowed investigators to reconstruct part of her route.
Supermarket purchases
Police sources report transactions at supermarkets in Playas del Coco and Brasilito. She also allegedly paid for a hotel stay in Flamingo.
She reportedly stopped at a shop in Abangares to buy food before continuing on to San José.
The suspect lives in the capital but frequently visits Guanacaste; investigators believe she often travels to the province on weekends.
The victim, Fleming, sustained head injuries. The apparent theft of his bank cards and their subsequent use are among the leading theories regarding the motive for the homicide.
Additionally, neighbors reported hearing screams coming from the home. A review of security footage allowed agents to obtain images of the suspect and track her movements.
The passenger vehicle she allegedly used to flee is also part of the investigation.
Description of the suspect
According to the authorities, the woman has the following characteristics: Fair complexion, Slender build, Black hair. Approximate height of 1.60 meters. At the time of the incident, she was wearing sandals, denim shorts, and a white bra-style top with chain-like accessories on the front.
If you have information that could help identify or locate the suspect, you can call the OIJ confidential hotline at 800-8000-645.
PLN legislator Ángela Aguilar is a cancer survivor.
Q COSTA RICA — It is no secret that cancer is a deadly disease that does not pause to wait for medical appointments, lab tests, radiological imaging, surgeries, radiation therapy, or chemotherapy.
Consequently, waiting lists for breast cancer treatment can pose a dangerous threat to women in Costa Rica.
As of March of this year, there was a waiting list of 42,000 women for ultrasounds within the CCSS (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) system, with wait times exceeding 300 days, according to Wágner Alpízar, a specialist in Cancer Biology and Biochemistry at the Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR)—University of Costa Rica.
The problem is that a four-week delay in curative cancer treatment is associated with an 8% to 12% increase in mortality across multiple cancer types and treatment modalities, the expert explained, citing international studies.
In this regard, Alpízar—who participated in a discussion on breast cancer detection organized by the office of legislator Ángela Aguilar (PLN)—highlighted the importance of making institutional changes to facilitate more timely diagnoses.
“By streamlining processes, we could substantially improve diagnosis and, above all, ensure that the diagnosis translates into rapid treatment. If we diagnose early but time passes without women receiving treatment, then the diagnosis becomes a waste of resources, as it will not translate into improved survival or quality of life for the women,” Alpízar said.
Leading Cancer in Costa Rica
In Costa Rica, between 1,337 and 1,344 new cases of breast cancer are reported annually—an incidence rate of approximately 37.5 to 55 cases per 100,000 women, according to Ministry of Health reports.
In total, more than 426 deaths among women of all ages are recorded each year due to cancer, making it the deadliest cancer for the female population.
Meanwhile, legislator Aguilar—herself a cancer survivor—shared her experience, emphasizing the urgent need to improve the institutional battle against time and to raise awareness among women so they can receive timely care.
“I am here because my cancer was detected in time, which allowed for timely treatment… Prevention and early detection save lives, and that is the message we are conveying,” said Aguilar.
Finally, Roberto Morales, a specialist in gynecologic oncology and obstetrics and gynecology at La Católica International Hospital, stated that women aged 40 to 75 with no risk factors should undergo a mammogram every two years, while those with a family history or predisposing conditions should do so annually.
The Data
In Costa Rica, breast cancer is the most frequently diagnosed malignant tumor and the leading cause of cancer-related mortality among women (Data from the CCSS, the Ministry of Health, and the UCR).
New cases: Approximately 1,337 to 1,344 new cases are reported annually, equating to an incidence rate of roughly 37.5 to 55 cases per 100,000 women, according to Ministry of Health reports.
Age group: 70% of new cases occur in women over the age of 50.
Risk ratio: It is estimated that one in every 20 to 25 women in the country will be diagnosed with this disease during her lifetime.
Annual deaths: More than 426 deaths per year are recorded among women of all ages (with a mortality rate close to 10.6 or higher per 100,000 women).
Age at death: Approximately 41% to 45% of deaths occur in women over the age of 70, although the disease also has a significant impact at younger ages (between 30 and 69).
Geographic distribution: Provinces such as Heredia and Cartago have shown some of the country’s highest mortality rates in recent periods (reaching 18–20 deaths per 100,000 women).
Prevention
Early detection and the adoption of healthy habits remain the most effective tools for reducing the impact of this disease in the country.
Mammography as the gold standard: This is the primary tool for early detection. It is recommended every two years for women aged 40 to 75, or earlier if there is a direct family history or other risk factors.
Body awareness (Self-examination): Complements mammography (does not replace it). It allows for the identification of unusual changes such as lumps, dimpling, nipple discharge, changes in skin texture, or swelling in the armpit.
Healthy lifestyle: Reducing alcohol consumption, maintaining a healthy body weight, engaging in regular physical activity, and avoiding smoking help lower the risk of developing this tumor.
Timely care at EBAIS/CCSS facilities: If you notice any suspicious signs or fall within the recommended age range, you should schedule an appointment at your local health center. Early detection raises survival rates to over 90%.
Mid-range position
Despite the campaigns conducted in Costa Rica, there is still much work to be done regarding breast cancer detection in the country.
The country falls into a mid-range category compared to other regions (figures represent the number of cases per 100,000 inhabitants, according to the International Agency for Research on Cancer).
Warning signs
Early identification of any unusual changes in the breasts is key to early diagnosis. Recognizing these signs allows for prompt action and seeking medical attention before the disease progresses.
Lump or thickening: Appearance of a mass, nodule, or hardened area in the breast or underarm, with or without pain.
Skin changes: Presence of dimpling, redness, scaling, indentations, or an “orange-peel” texture.
Nipple changes: Retraction or inversion of the nipple, localized pain, scaling, or changes in shape.
Abnormal discharge: Fluid or blood leaking from the nipple when not breastfeeding.
Changes in size or shape: Asymmetrical variation, swelling, or increased breast volume without an apparent cause.
National concern
Breast cancer is the most common cancer and the leading cause of death among women in Costa Rica.
Lawmakers, doctors, and other stakeholders are calling for improved care to reduce the number of fatal cases.